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The topic of this paper,' originally entitled "Recent and Dynamic
Changes In Economic and Legal Philosophies Relating to Mergers,"
has many facets. We shall try to identify the current merger trends, re-
lying on legal and economic analysis. Our theme is a thin trail through
an incredibly ovegrown thicket. We seek to identify: (1) the existence
of a merger problem; (2) the change in this movement starting in 1968;
(3) the legal framework under which existing regulating policy is di-
rected; (4) current interpretations of Section 7 of the Clayton Act as it
relates to the conglomerate movement; (5) actions taken by two enforce-
ment agencies to stem the rising tide of the current movement; and
(6) possible changes that would best achieve a sound antitrust policy.
* Associate Professor of Law at Duquesne University School of Law, B.A., Haverford
College, LL.B. Harvard.
** Doctoral Candidate, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, B.A. Mari-
etta, M.A. University of Pittsbugh.
1. An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Pennsylvania Conference of
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I. MERGER PROBLEM: THE DATA
The current merger wave, which has yet to crest, is one of the most
awesome tides of economic consolidation ever to hit the American
economy. It is rising unabated, even growing, yet hardly noticed by
the American public. The effect of this movement should not be
understated. The results of the current wave will last for generations, 2
for the entire structure of American industry is becoming more con-
centrated. A review of data for the past few years will illustrate the
problem.
The current wave began around 1955. Its acceleration can be illus-
trated by following the absolute increase as well as the rate of increase
in mergers. From 1955 to 1968 a total of 13,672 mergers were recorded
in the manufacturing and mining sectors, and if our estimate for 1969
-2,500 mergers3-is included, the total for a fourteen year period will
exceed 16,000. (Table 1)4 The number of mergers occurring in
all sectors from 1960 to 1968 totaled 18,038, and if a conservative
estimate of 5,0005 is included for 1969, the total activity involving
mergers in all sections will exceed 23,000 for a nine year period.
(Table 2) This number is even more significant if one looks at the
rate of increase in merger activity. The absolute increase as well as
the rate of increase indicates reason for concern over current merger
phenomena.6 Sixty percent (60%) of the merger activity since 1960
has occurred in the last half of this period. There was a fifty percent
(50%) increase in activity from 1966 to 1967 and a one hundred per-
cent (100%) increase in activity from 1967 to 1968.
On the basis of these figures the current movement is considerably
Economists, The Pennsylvania State University, June 6, 1969. This paper is part of a larger
research project on anti-trust problems in general and merger problems in particular. We
are indebted to Reuban E. Slesinger for his challenge to write this paper, to Professor
Morton Schnobel and Professor Mark Perlman for the conversations which helped us
discard some confusion encrusted in the field of industrial organization. We are also
indebted to Professor Nicholas Demas for reading and criticizing earlier efforts. Any
confusion which remains we stubbornly cling to.
2. The concern reflected here is in part due to historical restrospect. The effects of
past merger waves are with us today.
3. Estimate of 2500 is a conservative estimate with trend projection considered.
4. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, BUREAU OF ECONOMICS STATISTICAL REPORT, Current
Trends in Merger Activity, 1968. (hereinafter referred to as FTC 1968 STATISTICAL RE-
PORT)
5. Our estimate based on projected trend data.
6. S. REID, MERGERS MANAGERS AND THE ECONOMY (1968) Ch. 3 & 5. A good discussion of
current trends in the merger movement.
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TABLE 1
NUMBER OF MANUFACTURING AND MINING CONCERNS AcQuIRE, 1940-1968 AND
ACQUIRED ASSETs1 OF MANUFACTURING AND MINING CONCERNS, 1948-1968
Acquired Acquired
Assets4  Assets
4
Period Number3 ($Billions) Period Number3 ($Billions)
1940 140 1954 387 $ IA25
1941 111 1955 683 2.129
1942 118 1956 673 2.037
1943 213 1957 585 1.472
1944 324 1958 589 1.107
1945 333 1959 835 1.960
1946 419 1960 844 1.710
1947 404 1961 954 2.129
1948 223 $ .130 1962 853 2.194
1949 126 .067 1963 861 2.917
1950 219 .173 1964 854 2.798
1951 235 .201 1965 1,008 3.900
1952 288 .327 1966 995 4.100
1953 295 .679 1967 1,496 8.222
19682 2,442 12.616
1. Acquisitions of manufacturing and mining firms with assets of $10 million or
more.
2. Figures for 1968 are preliminary.
3. Sources: Data limited to mergers and acquisitions reported by Moody's Investors
Service, Inc., and Standard & Poor's Corporation. Comparable totals for the years 1919
to 1939 were published in the Commission's Report on Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions,
May 1955, p. 33.
4. Sources: Economic Report of the President, 1969, p. 271, and Bureau of Economics,
Federal Trade Commission.
SOURCE: Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Tables 2 and 9, FTC
1968 STATISTCAL REPORT.
larger than all previous merger movements. In the first merger wave,
1898 to 1902, 2,653 mergers were reported.7 In the second wave, 1925
to 1931, 5,846 mergers were reported.8 The current wave, with nearly
23,000 mergers catalogued, has outshadowed previous waves in abso-
lute terms. (Table 1)
Another measure is the amount of assets involved in the acquisitions.
The ownership of manufacturing assets has become increasingly con-
centrated. According to the Department of Justice in its recent com-
plaint against Ling-Tempco-Vought, 9 "The proportion of total assets
of the nation's manufacturing corporations held by the 200 largest
firms has increased from 48.1% in 1948, to 54.2% in 1960, to 58.7% in
1967." 10 The complaint further asserts that "a great bulk of this in-
7. S. REID, supra note 6, at 74.
8. Id.
9. United States v. Ling Tempco Vought, Inc., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. and Jones
and Laughlin Industries, Civil Action, 69-438, D.C., W.D. Pa., complaint filed April 14,
1969.
10. Id. at 4.
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TABLE 2
OVERALL NUMBER OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS RECORDED,
BY INDUSTRY OF ACQUIRING COMPANY, 1960-1968
Industry1 of
acquiring company 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
Total recorded 1,345 1,724 1,667 1,479 1,797 1,893 1,746 2,384 4,003
Full acquisitions2  1,216 1,592 1,504 1,329 1,519 1,628 1,517 2,181 3,803
Mining* 48 74 48 79 59 62 55 82 130
Manufacturing* 918 1,043 985 906 1,006 1,063 1,051 1,557 2,525Trade3 127 255 235 186 207 191 188 232 452Services and others4 123 220 236 158 247 312 223 310 696
Partial acquisitions5 129 132 163 150 278 265 229 203 200
1. Broad industrial classification of acquiring company in full acquisitions only.
2. Acquisitions of other independent companies, subsidiaries of other independent
companies, and whole divisions of other independent companies.
3. Wholesale and retail trade combined.
4. "Others" consists mainly of companies engaged in insurance, warehousing and
storage, commercial farming, contract construction, and extending credit to businesses
and individuals (other than banks).
5. Acquisitions involving less than half of the assets or stock of a company.
* Totals are larger than those shown on subsequent tables because of the use of
additional sources.
SOURCES: Moody's Industrials (semi-weekly), Standard Corporation Records (daily),Wall Street Journal, Journal of Commerce, and New York Times; BUREAU OF ECONOMICS,
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Table 1, FTC 1968 STATISTICAL REPORT.
crease in concentration has resulted from mergers and acquisitions.""'
A number of independent companies have disappeared from the
list of most active companies in the country. From 1948 to 1966, 912
large (over $10 million in assets) manufacturing and mining concerns,
with combined assets of $31 billion, were absorbed by other firms
through merger and acquisition. Nearly half of these assets were ac-
quired during the last 5 years.12 Federal Trade Commission data' 3 further
illustrates this fact: acquisitions by the 200 largest mining and manu-
facturing firms or units with assets of $10 million or more have risen
sharply during this period; i.e., 91 occurring in 1964, 93 in 1965, 101
in 1966, 169 in 1967, 192 in 1968.
An evalulation of the total assets acquired in mergers of this type
shows an even more striking acceleration. The amount of assets ac-
quired within this classification in 1964 was $2.7 billion, it rose steadily
through the period: in 1964 $2.7 billion, in 1965 $3.7 billion, in 1966
$4.1 billion, in 1967 $8.2 billion, in 1968 $12.6 billion (Table 1).
There was a one hundred percent (100%) increase in merger activity
based on asset acquisition from 1966 to 1967 and a fifty percent (50%)
11. Id.
12. FTC. 1968 STATISTICAL REPORT, at 2.
13. FTC 1968 STATISTICAL REPORT, Table 5, p. vii
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from 1967 to 1968. Over the current period $40.5 billion worth of
assets have been acquired (Table 2). Acquisition by approximately 200
companies (assets of $250 million or more) account for over 70% of
Manufacturing and Mining assets acquired in 1968.14
In 1965 only one firm with assets of more than $250 million was
absorbed by merger or acquisition. But the total quickly rose. There
were 3 in 1966, 6 in 1967 and 12 in 1968 (Table 3).
TABLE 3
NUMBER AND ASSETS OF LARGE MANUFACTURING AND MINING COMPANIES:
ACQUIRED, BY INDUSTRY OF AcquIRED COMPANY, 19681
Number
Industry of of
acquired acqui- Per- Assets Per-
company sitions cent ($Millions) cent
Food and kindred products 17 8.9 $ 1,475.0 11.7
Tobacco manufacturers 3 1.6 514.2 4.1
Textile mill products 9 4.7 324.9 2.6
Apparel 4 2.1 383.3 3.0
Lumber and wood products 3 1.6 35.5 0.3
Furniture and fixtures 4 2.1 160.5 1.3
Paper and allied products 8 4.2 1,061.2 8.4
Printing and publishing 10 5.2 249.2 2.0
Chemicals and allied products 8 4.2 620.9 4.9
Petroleum and oil products 2 1.0 761.4 6.0
Rubber and plastics products, n.e.c. 2 1.0 27.9 0.2
Leather and leather products 2 1.0 34.2 0.3
Stone, clay, and glass products 4 2.1 66.8 0.5
Primary metal industries 15 7.8 2,227.6 17.7
Fabricated metal products 19 9.9 488.7 3.9
Machinery, except electrical 37 19.3 1,546.4 12.3
Electrical machinery 14 7.3 944.5 7.5
Transportation equipment 9 4.7 696.2 5.5
Instruments and related products 4 2.1 130.4 1.0
Miscellaneous manufacturing 8 4.2 211.6 1.7
Mining 10 5.2 655.8 5.2
Total 192 100.02 $12,616.2 100.02
1. Figures for 1968 are preliminary.
2. Percentages do not add to 100.0 due to rounding.
SOURCE: BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Table 12, FTC 1968
STATISTICAL REPORT.
These figures indicate the size of the movement. This examination
leads us to the inescapable conclusion that concentration has increased
during the current period.
A recent study by the Federal Trade Commission covering the pe-
riod 1950-1962, was referred to by the FTC's Chief Economist, Willard
F. Mueller, in his 1965 statement before the Senate Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly.' 5 He testified:
14. Id. at 2.
15. S. REID, supra note 6 at 81.
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The Commission's earlier studies in the area of aggregate con-
centration indicate that there has been a sizable increase in con-
centration for manufacturing as a whole. Between 1950 and 1962
the share of manufacturing assets held by the 200 largest corpora-
tions increased from 46.7 to 54.6 percent and the share held by
the 100 largest corporations grew from 38.6 to 45 percent. Hence
by 1962 the share held by the 100 largest firms was almost as great
as the share held by the 200 largest in 1950 . . . [and] the 200
largest manufacturing firms alone acquired over 2,000 concerns
with combined assets of about 17.5 billion. . . . In other words,
the acquisitions activity of the top 200 was sufficient to more than
wipe out the equivalent of the second tier of 1,000 corporations
in manufacturing.' 6
II. THE MERGER PROBLEM: 1968
The characteristics of 1968 may mark a turning point or may act
as a base from which the merger movement will skyrocket. All pre-
vious levels of merger activity were eclipsed by development in 1968.
According to the FTC 1968 Statistical Report, total mergers climbed
to a record 4,003 for 1968, an increase of 68 percent over the previous
year (Table 1). In 1968, a firm with assets of more than $1 billion
($1.15) was acquired, marking a new first (Table 3): Ling-Tempco-
Vought bought Jones and Laughlin Steel Company, the nation's sixth
largest steel producer with 1968 sales of over $1 billion and assets
of over $1.15 billion. In 1967, J & L accounted for between five to
ten percent of national steel output.17
Manufacturing and mining acquisitions totaled 2,442 for 1968 a
63% increase over the 1967 figure of 1,496 which in turn was a 50%
increase over the 1966 figure (Table 2). This trend left no segment
of manufacturing and mining untouched. Growth sectors (electrical,
non-electrical machinery, chemicals and fabricated metals) experienced
the most rapid merger growth; they accounted for nearly 900 acquisi-
tions in 1968.' s Merger activity in trade and service sectors also rose
sharply in 1968, accounting for 29% of overall activity. In 1966
trade and service sectors recorded 188 and 223 mergers, respectively; in
1968 these numbers had climbed to 452 and 696. This is an increase
16. COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, SENATE SuBCOMMrIEE ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY,
ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION, 89th Cong., 1st. Sess., (1965), part 2, at 519.
17. United States v. Ling Tempco Vought, Inc., complaint, supra note 9.
18. These sectors known as "growth sectors" seem to be the likeliest for merger
activity.
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of 140% in the trade sector and more than 200% in the service sector
(Table 2).
Measured by assets, mergers also showed a sharp increase during
1968. Acquisition of firms with assets over $10 million totaled $12.6
billion for 1968, a 50% increase over the 1967 figure. This figure in
turn was 3 times greater than the 1966 figure (Table 2). The average
size of these acquisitions has also grown sharply, from $27.6 million
in 1966 to $65.7 million in 1968, an increase of 138%. 19 In 1968,
acquiring firms with assets of $250 million or more accounted for 51%
of the number and 73% of the assets of all large acquisitions. Conglo-
merate mergers increased sharply during the year 1968, accounting for
84% of the number and 89% of the assets of all recorded large acquisi-
tions (Table 4).
In 1968, when the total assets acquired in mining and manufactur-
ing, $17.6 billion, are compared with investment for that period we
find that the acquisition of used assets accounts for 45% of the total
value of new investment in plants and equipment. 20 This ratio repre-
sents a substantial growth over all earlier years.
Conglomerate mergers of 1968 revealed a dramatic change in char-
acter and average size. The classification used by the FTC includes
product extension, (geographic) market extension, and a category repre-
senting combinations where no relationship is discernible. The latter
we will hereinafter call the "pure" conglomerate and/or "free form".
In 1968 the pure conglomerate category accounted for 43% of all
large acquisitions.2' The most striking feature of the current wave is
that mergers and acquisitions have become more circular and conglo-
merate oriented than any of the two previous waves. All forms of con-
glomerate mergers accounted for 87% of all large acquisitions.
Apart form the impressiveness of the raw figures, we may validly
ask, "Is this merger wave serious?" The FTC Bureau of Economics,
in its recently published Economic Report on Corporate Mergers,22
thinks that it is serious. The Stigler Task Force hinted that it was
not convinced.2 A justification for writing further must be based on
19. FTC 1968 STATISTICAL REPORT at 2.
20. Id.
21. United States v. Ling Tempco Vought, Inc., complaint, supra note 9.
22. BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ECONOMIC
REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS (U.S. Govt. Printing Office, Washington, 1969), passim
[hereinafter referred to as FTC CONGLOMERATE MERGER REPORT].
23. Task Force on Productivity and Competition B.N.A. ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULA-
TION REPORT No. 413 (June 10, 1969), (hereinafter refered to as the STIGLER REPORT)
Recommendations 7 and 8, in particular, were as follows:
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either: (a) a belief that increasing "overall concentration" in the
economy 24 is a real problem (perhaps a social and political, instead
of, or in addition to, an economic problem), or (b) a belief that, apart
from any increases in overall concentration, particular mergers may
have harmful effects-and the harmful effects may be compounded
if such mergers take place in large numbers over a short period of
time. Both these contentions have some validity, although strong
arguments can be made against each of them.2 5
"Overall concentration" figures may cause concern about the pol-
7. The Department of Justice Merger Guidelines are extraordinarily stringent, and
in some respects indefensible. We suggest a number of revisions in the accompanying
Report.
8. We strongly recommend that the Department decline to undertake a program of
action against conglomerate mergers and conglomerate enterprises, pending a con-
ference to gather information and opinion on the economic effects of the conglom-
erate phenomenon. More broadly, we urge the Department to resist that natural
temptation to utilize the antitrust laws to combat social problems not related to the
competitive functioning of markets.
24. "Overall concentration" is placed in quotation marks because: (1) There is disagree-
ment as to just what the term means, and how to measure it. See Rose, Bigness, Is a
Numbers Game, FORTUNE, Vol. 80, No. 6, p. 112 (November, 1969); Adelman, Monopoly
and Concentration, in Low, THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST (1968) 43, 52-59. (2) There is
disagreement over whether "overall concentration" means anything in terms of economic
power in particular markets (which most economists would view as the only relevant
terms), or in terms of anything else. Adelman, Monopoly and Concentration, supra, this
footnote. But see FTC CONGLOMERATE MERGER REPORT, Chapter 3 and Appendices A
through G, pp. 161-212, 655-745.
It is true, as Adelman points out, that "overall concentration" need not necessarily
have anything to do with concentration in particular markets. "Overall" concentration
could, as a matter of mathematics, increase without concentration in any particular
market increasing, if (a) one particular product market expanded relative to other
product markets, but (b) the concentration in no product market changed. To take a
drastically oversimplified example: Suppose there were 5 widget producers, sharing
equally the widget market, which amounted to 1% of the total U.S. gross national
product. Suppose also there is no significant overall concentration elsewhere in the
economy. Then suppose that the market for widgets expands to 50% of total U.S. gross
national product, that the original 5 firms continue to share the market equally, and
that the market shares of other companies in other markets also do not change. Overall
concentration has increased to the point where 5 firms now account for 50% of all
productive activity in the economy; concentration in any particular market has not
changed at all.,
This example may be regarded as a rather trivial mathematical exercise. It is relevant
only to the point that "overall" concentration does not necessarily indicate anything
about economic power within particular markets. In the real world, things are not at
all like our simple example. Many industries, perhaps most, are somewhat oligopolized.
FTC CONGLOMERATE MERGER REPORT 248-249. (This statement is obviously open to question
with respect to what is meant by "somewhat." We here mean that some of the theoret-
ically predicted behavior of oligopoly markets can be observed in many of the markets
occupied by large conglomerates. FTC CONGLOMERATE MERGER REPORT at 245-50 and
Chapter 6) Since, as we will see (Part V, infra) mergers among the leaders of oligopolized
industries tend to tighten or entrench the oligolopoly structure of the markets of merging
firms, even though each merger is across industry lines and therefore in a technical sense
does not immediately result in increased market concentration. In this context, there
seems to be ample reason for concern about the sharp increases in oversuch concentration.
25. See, e.g., Adelman, supra note 24.
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itical consequences of such a centralization of economic power. Two
hundred corporations account for over 60% of all manufacturing
assets. 26 One hundred seven corporation account for 50% of all man-
ufacturing assets. 2 7 And these figures probably understate the true
concentration for several reasons:
(1) Many of the 200 largest corporations do not fully consolidate
the assets of all their subsidiary companies.
(2) Some large corporations themselves have common owners
and;
(3) Some large corporations jointly own with other companies
subsidiary concerns that are only partially included in the
assets of their corporate parents. 28
Based on other parts of the report, we add:
(4) At least 48% of the companies included in the top 1000 in 1968
were corporations in which other corporations in the same group held
equity interests amounting to more than 10%.29
(5) Banks and other financial institutions own significant interests
in the large manufacturing corporations-and often have representa-
tives on the boards of directors of the companies in which they hold
interests.30 The pervasiveness of interlocking among the management
and boards of directors of many corporations significantly reduces the
number of independent business decision-making units in our economy;
exactly what the reduction is, quantitatively, is hard to define, but
that it is significant seems clear. To take just one example:
General Motors Corporation, the country's largest industrial
corporation when measured by sales, was interlocked with 7 of
the 100 largest industrial corporations, with the Nation's largest
railroad, and with the largest telephone company. All told, the
63 corporations with which General Motors was interlocked in
1962 had combined assets exceeding $65 billion.3'
Analysis of aggregate figures, however, may not correctly indicate
the impact of the current merger wave. To isolate the economic effects
26. 60.9% of total corporate manufacturing assets, and 60.4% of all manufacturing
assets. FTC CONGLOMERATE MERGER REPORT 172.
27. Id. at 168.
28. Id. at 174.
29. Id. at 169.
30. The inter-corporate ties include at least joint ventures and interlocking directorates,
as well as less formal relationships. For a discussion of the formal relationships, see FTC
CONGLOMERATE MERGER REPORT at 198-212. For a discussion of some less formal ties, see
FTC CONGLOMERATE MERGER REPORT at 458-471.
31. Id. at 199.
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of particular mergers and of series of mergers, we have examined var-
ious studies, especially the FCC Conglomerate Mergers Report and
the cases described in Part V, infra.3 2 Some startling conclusions devel-
oped.
The data seem to indicate that the law has been able to check only
simple horizontal and vertical mergers; all other types of mergers have
accelerated. (See Table 4). While the Celler-Kefauver Act 3 was enacted
to preserve market competition in a narrow economic sense, it was also
concerned with the preservation of overall economic concentration.
Admittedly, we may not want an industrial structure so highly frag-
mented that we cannot have the benefits of the economies of scale
so popularly known as "mass production"; but we by no means need
the concentration that is generally taking place, that which exceeds the
optimum technical organization mix. 4 Reasons for mergers seem un-
related to requirements of efficiency. The evidence seems to indicate
that institutional arrangements involving taxation,3 5 accounting meth-
ods,36 and the stock market 37 have played the major role in encourag-
ing the current movement. There is little evidence that the current
movement has generally exploited opportunities to improve efficiency
in resource allocation.38 What we do see is a centralizing and consolidat-
ing of corporate control and decision making among a relatively few
vast companies.
Functional integration in production and distribution are becoming
less apparent. We all know that within the American economic system
there is a separation of ownership from management.3 9 But the case
32. The conclusions we here draw are based upon the various cases reviewed in Parts
4 and 5, infra, and upon FTC Conglomerate Merger Report, especially by Chapter 5,
entitled "Most Active Acquiring Firms, 1961-68," and Chapter 8, entitled "Case Studies
of Most Active Acquiring Firms." The FTC there studied the 25 most active (during the
1960's) acquiring firms. Other studies have been conducted, see e.g. Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, United
States Senate, Part 1, Overall and Conglomerate Aspects, 88th Congress, 2d Session, pur-
suant to S. Res. 262, July 1, 2 and Sept. 9, 10, and 11, 1964, and Part 2, Mergers and
Other Factors Affecting Industry Concentration, 89th Congress, 1st Session, pursuant to
S. Res. 40, Mar. 16, 17, 18, Apr. 13, 14, 15, and 21, 1965; but the FTC CONGLOMERATE
MERGER REPORT contains the most up to date collected data as of this writing.
33. Act of December 29, 1950, c. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125, 15 U.S.C. § 18.
34. See, e.g., FTC CONGLOMERATE MERGER REPORT 87-89.
35. Id. at 142-159.
36. Id. at 120-141.
37. Id. at 80-85.
38. Id. 72-76, 85-99. Conglomerates did not even seem to improve profits. Id. at 100-119;
REID, supra. note 6, at 181-194.
39. See, e.g., S. REI, supra. note 6, Chapters 7 and 8 for a good discussion of this fact
and of some of its implications with respect to this merger wave.
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studies of firms of the current wave indicate that one further separa-
tion is underway: a separation of management from production.40 The
current wave may be creating a system of nationally centralized private
decision-making units that is incompatible with efficient patterns of
economic organization, and may be politically undesirable. The new
giants may hope that sheer size will isolate them from the market
forces that traditionally discipline private economic power. They are
"growth companies" but have relied on external rather than internal
growth. Any growth, of course, even external growth, might be ex-
pected to temporarily isolate them from market forces because of
their size and financial resources.
But suppose, for example, that there is a major cyclical downswing.
It is one thing to have smaller marginal firms leave the productive pro-
cess as their profit levels fall below what is acceptable. This phenome-
non causes periodic ripples in the economy as these units leave. But
what would happen if large conglomerates, holding these smaller mar-
ginal units, were to support the smaller units until their resources were
finally exhausted. Instead of smaller marginal units falling by the way-
side on a downswing, we could have units accounting for as much as
several billion dollars of output falling out of the industrial structure at
one time. When General Motors, General Electric, or United States
Steel have a strike, a temporary shutdown, the impact is felt in almost
every sector of the economy.41 What would happen if LTV, IT 8 T,
and Gulf & Western ceased operations altogether? What kind of a snow-
ball effect could be created?
Economic analysis indicates that a part of the motivation for the
40. This statement can be supported by a consideration of the management problem
in a conglomerate. If one is the president of, say ITT, with 10 divisions in telecommuni-
cations equipment, 17 divisions in electronic components and consumer products, 14
divisions in technical industrial products, 16 divisions in consumer and business services, 3
divisions in defense industries, and 3 "miscellaneous" divisions (FTC CONGLOMERATE
MERGER REPORT at 525) and one is also engaged in a fight with the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice over from 1 to 5 other acquisitions, then one is not going to
pay too much attention to production in any one division.
Overall management in a conglomerate-especially an active conglomerate (ITT made
over six mergers per year; Teledyne during the 1960's made over fifteen mergers per year)
-is likely to be more concerned with the financial and stock market position of the
company than with production.
41. In SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, Volume 49, No. 12 (United States Department of
Commerce, Office of Business Economics, December, 1969) at 1, the fact that the economy
was softening, and that Gross National Product was falling off, was attributed to the im-
pact of the General Electric strike-both directly and through the multiplier effect of the
decrease in GE purchases of goods and services and in GE employee purchases of goods
and services.
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current wave must be a desire to overcome the microeconomic forces42
that discipline private economic power. Generally speaking we have
seen more rigid pricing behaviour and a higher degree of product dif-
ferentiation 43 develop in many markets during the last 25 years. One
aim of many current mergers seems to have been to give the acquiring
firm a dominant position in some broad sector. Size, diversification,
access to capital, captive customers, captive suppliers, have been types
of power available to conglomerate firms. Product extension mergers
into industries closely affiliated in a technological sense have also been
prime targets. 44 Attributable to the current wave are also increased
barriers to entry and acts which discourage potential competition by
independents.45 Price competition is affected by two key variables:
independent units and potential entry. Acquiring firms in the current
wave have hindered the free interplay of these two important economic
variables. They have raised the costs of entry, and increased the degree
of product differentiation and the degree of seller concentration. All
of these effects convince us that the current rate of merger activity poses
a serious problem.
A further reason for considering the current merger wave serious is
that the effects of two other merger waves, each of far smaller dimen-
sions, are still with us. A merger wave from about 1898 to 190446 re-
sulted in the formation of many giant manufacturing corporations,
whose existence still inhibits competition in their respective industries
because of e.g., price leadership practices, and the tendency for other
companies to try to join forces in order to feel, psychologically, "on
a par" with the giants.47 United States Steel Corporation, United 'States
Rubber Corporation (now merged with the Royal Tire Company to
42. "Microeconomics" deals with the economic decisions and behavior of individual
consumers, individual firms, and industries, interacting in markets. For its range see,
e.g. C. FERGUSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY (2d Ed., 1968).
43. "Product differentiation" refers to artificial or unreal product differentiation based
on building the belief in consumers' minds that products, which actually do not differ in
any significant respect, are different. The tools of product differentiation are principally
advertising and packaging. Frequently the packaging and the advertising may be related
-this may be easiest where the packaging is incorporated in the product, as in auto-
mobile&.
44. See, e.g., the oil company-chemical company mergers, and the multi-mineral mining
company mergers, in Table 3, supra. p. 253. The former are discussed in FTC CONGLOMER-
ATE MERGER REPORT 283-314, especially 302-312.
45. These specific effects in and on markets will be discussed, infra., Part 5, in detail.
46. S. REID, supra note 6. Ch. 3.
47. This is the "triggering other mergers" problem discussed in connection with the
current merger wave, infra., Part 4, Section F(2), and Part 5, Section A.
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form "Uniroyal"), American Tabacco Company, and the American
Can Company are examples.4 8
A second merger wave in the late 1920's 49 produced large holding
corporations such as the Allegheny Corporation and the United Cor-
poration. 50 It also, in manufacturing, resulted in securing the positions
of a number of firms which were (and are) not the largest, but are
among the largest, firms in their industries; several of the largest firms
also consolidated themselves, assuring that their tenure as the dominant
firm in their respective industries would be lengthened.5'
If the effects of these two earlier merger waves are still with us, if
mergers consummated at the turn of the century, and in the 1920's,
are still exerting an inhibitory effect on competition, it certainly seems
reasonable to be concerned about the building of such conglomerate
giants as Ling-Tempco-Vought, International Telephone & Telegraph
Corp., Textron, Inc., Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., FMC Corp.,
McDonnell Douglas Corp., Teledyne, Inc., and McDonnell-Douglas
Corp.,52 during the current merger wave. Will they increase the in-
stability of the economy? To what extent will they dominate either
the economy or their respective industries, or both, thirty years from
now?
The conclusion of the Stigler Task Force that the current merger
wave is not especially serious, and that the Department of Justice has
"over-reacted," both in its published Merger Guidelines and in its
current enforcement policies, 53 seems to us to be short-sighted. The
conclusion expressed must revolve around a preliminary question:
How much evidence does one demand before acting? If the effect of
continuing our present course may be drastic, even catastrophic, per-
haps, we should stop while we study the problem. For example, we
may not be absolutely certain, even now, that cigarette smoking has
effects on human health; but if it does have an effect, it is life itself
48. S. REDm, supra note 6, Ch. 3; FTC CONGLOMERATE MERGER REPORT 30-33.
49. S. REID, supra note 6, Ch. 4; FTC CONGLOMERATE MERER REPORT 33-38.
50. Bonbright and Means, Holding Companies, United States 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SciEN Es 403, 408, 409 (1962). Both of the named holding companies were formed
in 1929. The latter is asserted (Id. at 408-409) to have "working control of or substantial
influence over" public utility companies "whose combined assets approach those of the
American Telephone and Telegraph Company."
51. S. REID, supra note 6, Ch. 3; FTC CONGLOMERATE MERGER REPORT 33-38.
52. FTC CONGLOMERATE MERGER REPORT 260-261. It will be noted that, for all of these
firms except ITT, acquired assets accounted for more than 70% of the growth, from 1961
through 1968 inclusive of total assets.
53. STIGLER REPORT, Recommendations 7 and 8, quoted in note 23, supra.
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that is at stake: Not being sure, it seems wiser to stop smoking than
to continue. We may call a halt to enforcement activity until we are
sure that the merger movement will harm us. Or we may call a halt
to the merger movement until such time as we are reasonably sure
that it will not harm us.
The potential harm seems great. The current merger wave may
result in a rather thorough restructuring of American industry if it
continues at its present rateZ4 Past merger waves have had such an
effect. It would seem to us the better part of valor to call a halt to
mergers, and not to Clayton § 7 enforcement activity, until we have
some idea of the probable effects of the current movement. The Stigler
Task Force's contrary conclusion would appear to us to be based almost
solely on short-run economic theoretical analysis, and not on either
long-run economic analysis, or on long-run observed effects of other
merger waves.
III. THE MERGER PROBLEM: THE LAW
Using the law as an analytic framework, we shall analyze the effects
of particular mergers, on a case by case basis. Nevertheless, the effects
of a series of mergers, a "trend toward concentration" may become
relevant in assessing the substantiality of harm in particular horizontal,
vertical, and possibly even product extension or geographic market
extension merger cases. The effects of the entire wave become relevant
in assessing the substantiality of the harm in "pure" conglomerate or
"free form" merger cases.55
Section 7 of the Clayton Act 6 is designed to deal with particular
mergers, on a case by case basis, rather than with a merger movement.
54. B. BOCK, IN ANTITRUST ISSUES AND CONGLOMERATE ACQUISITIONS (National Industrial
Conference Board, New York, 1969) 36-39, argues that market boundries have blurred, and
industrial structure has already changed, both in a way and to an extent such that con-
ventional antitrust theory makes little sense, now. Surely such a conclusion might justify
our stopping and taking a look before the wave engulfs us, rather than afterward. If we
then decided we granted to proceed, all well and good: at least we would have an idea
we were going where we wanted to go. Furthermore, if the possibility of getting a signal
to restart the merger wave were conditioned on actually getting the information from
corporations and others that were interested, such information would be more likely to
be forthcoming than if we told the business community to "continue merging until we
can manage to prove it is fairly certain to harm the economy."
55. The question of substantiality in conglomerate merger cases is probably more in
need of clarification than any other single legal question. We do not claim to have
accomplished this, but the question is discussed infra., Part 5. Section B.
56. Act of December 29, 1950, c. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125, 15 U.S.C. § 18. _,.
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The fact that a merger movement or wave, started three or four
years57 after Clayton § 7 was amended to be more restrictive of merg-
ers raises the question of whether the language of the amendment is
relevant to the current merger wave, and whether, if the language
seems to be relevant, it has been interpreted out of existence by the
courts.
The possibility that the language of the amended Clayton § 7 does
not adequately "cover" the problem must be taken seriously, in light
of the history of the two earlier merger waves referred to. History
could be repeating itself: The Sherman Act 58 was interpreted out of
effective existence (for many years) by the E. C. Knight case; 59 and
Section 7 of the Clayton Act as originally enacted passed out of effective
existence because it covered only stock acquisitions.60 It is conceivable
that because of some oversight in drafting, or because the dimensions
of the current merger could not then be foreseen, the amendment to
Section 7, enacted in 195061 ostensibly to prohibit mergers, has been
interpreted out of effective existence.
In each of the earlier waves, the form of the mergers was significantly
affected by the antitrust statutes in force at the time. 2 Since "man-
ufacturing [was] not commerce,"63 companies merging during the
first merger wave, 1898-1904, avoided the Sherman Act by concentrat-
ing on manufacturing corporations.6 4 Since the original Section 7 of
the Clayton Act prohibited stock acquisitions but did not prohibit as-
set acquisitions, companies merging during the second merger wave,
57. In 1954 or 1955. See Table 1, supra; the date depends on whether number of
mergers or value of acquired assets is used as a criteria. The latter can be distorted by
one or two large mergers. See, e.g. FTC CONGLOMERATE MERGER REPORT, footnote 1, p. 35,
Figure 1-2, p. 36. The sharp upturn, in both number of mergers and value of acquired
assets, started in 1966. Id., Figure 1-2, p. 36, and Figure 1-3, p. 40.
58. Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. §§l-7.
59. United States v. E.C. Knight Company, 156 US. 1, (1895).
60. Act of October 15, 1914, c. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731. The original wording provided:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire. . . the whole or any part of
the stock ... of another corporation . . . where the effect of such acquisition may be
to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so ac-quired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in
any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce.
61. Act of December 29, 1950, c. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125, 15 U.S.C. § 18. For the wording of
this amendment see note 74 and accompanying text.
62. Stigler, "The Economic Effects of the Antitrust Laws," 9 JOuRNAL OF LAW AND
ECONOMIcS 225 (1966), discusses this effect. See S. REED, supra note 6, Chapters 3 and 4, for
a good discussion of the historical evidence.
63. United States v. E.C. Knight Company, 156 v.5.1, at 12, 14, 17. S. REID, supra note 6,
has speculated, that the decision in Northern Securities Co. v. United States 193 U.S. 197(1904), signaled the end of this first merger wave.
64. S. RLE, supra note 6, Chapter 3.
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1925-1931, seldom took the stock acquistion route,65 substituting the
asset acquisition, 66 route to merger.67
During the current wave, the Supreme Court, in a series of opinions
starting with Brown Shoe-Kinney Shoe,68 in 1962, has developed an
interpretation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act which has grown in-
creasingly restrictive. It is not that the later opinions are inconsistent
with the earlier opinions, but rather that each major opinion has made
it clear that the statute applies to a new class of cases. 69
It is clear, in June, 1969, that Section 7, as amended in 1950, pro-
hibits most major horizontal mergers, and most major vertical merg-
ers.70 It is fairly clear that product extension and geographic market
extension mergers involving an acquisition by a major corporation of
one of the leading companies in a "neighboring" product or geographic
market will be proscribed. 7x It is probable that a product extension or
geographic market extension merger which gives the merged company
the power to foreclose a substantial share of some market will be pro-
scribed.7 2 It seems likely that these rules have been influential in divert-
ing the current merger wave from simple horizontal and vertical
mergers to conglomerate, product extension or market extension merg-
ers. 78 As to "pure" conglomerate, or "free-form," mergers, where there
is no immediately discernible relationship between the activities of
65. Act of October 15, 1914, c. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 18.
66. Cf. FTC v. Swift & Company, 272 US. 554, (1926).
67. S. REID, supra note 6, Chapter 4. Stigler, supra note 62.
68. Brown Shoe Company v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
69. See, e.g., editorial comment in Fortune Magazine following each Supreme Court
Decision to date.
70. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe
Company v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
71. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Company, 386 US. 568 (1967); General Foods Corp.,
TRADE REG. RaP. 17,465 (FTC 1966) [1965-1967 Transfer Binder], aff'd. 386 F.2d 936
(3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied 391 U.S. 919 (1968); United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods
Corp., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Illinois 1968); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Com-
pany, 376 US. 651 (1964); United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Company, 378 U.S. 158
(1964).
72. Brown Shoe Company v. United States, 370 US. 294 (1962); FTC v. Consolidated
Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
73. It is clear, from the data reviewed in Parts I and II and in, that the current
merger wave has been so diverted. Our conclusion that the antitrust laws have been a
causal factor in this diversion, is based on: (1) our observation, based on economic
theory, that in the absence of any antitrust laws, businessmen ought to prefer horizontal
mergers (to the point of monopoly) to any other type, and ought to prefer vertical mergers
(which allow the rationalization of all facets of a manufacturing and selling process) over
conglomerate mergers; (2) the testimony of various persons in business and industry
involved with various aspects of merger problems; (3) on Stigler, supra note 62, and (4)
on S. REID, supra note 6. See supra note 21, supra.
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the merging corporations (other than the fact that they, e.g., borrow
money from the same bank, ship their products via the same common
carrier), the law has said little.
In a real sense, then, history is indeed repeating itself. The "anti-
merger" amendment to Clayton § 7 has had an effect; but that effect
has been to deflect the merger movement from simpler horizontal and
vertical merger forms to various conglomerate merger forms.
The question is: Can Section 7 be used to effectively block the in-
creasing tide of conglomerate merger activity in the economy?
IV. SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT: CURRENT INTERPRETATIONS
To answer this question, we will determine what is the approach
of the courts and of the enforcing agencies to merger problems, gen-
erally, and then make some predictions as to whether and how the
same approach might affect mergers classified as "conglomerate."
We state our conclusion in advance, and without noting all the
qualifications and explanations which will be discussed below:
The government must prove that it is reasonably probable that com-
petition, in the future, will be substantially less if the merger in ques-
tion takes place than if the merger in question does not take place.
To justify this conclusion we must develop some operative definition
of the language in Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Not, simply, what
do the words mean, but what must be proved when the government
brings an action for divestiture or to enjoin a merger.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital,
and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of
another corporation also engaged in commerce, where in any line
of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acqui-
sition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly.7 4
74. Act of December 29, 1950, c. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (emphasis added).
The Sherman Act, Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. §§1-7, is largely
ignored herein, not because it is irrelevant-it may ultimately prove very relevant-but
because it has been largely ignored by the enforcement agencies. Short of some fairly
special cases, a merger "may tend to lessen competition," within the meaning that phrase
has been given, long before any Sherman Act problem is visible.
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A. "may"
The statutory condition for illegality-"where the effect may be
substantially to lessen competition"-duplicates language in Section 2
and in Section 375 of the Clayton Act. There was ample precedent on
the meaning of "may" in these Sections prior to the amendment of
Section 7 in 1950: "may be" means "will reasonably probably be." 76
Confronted with the duplication of language, it did not seem unduly
difficult for the courts to hold that the same language, used in Section
7 had the same meaning as that in the other two sections.77
More bothersome to the average businessman or economist 78 is the
question of what "reasonably probable" means. A reference to statis-
tical analysis presents the clearest analogy: the judgmental process is
exactly equivalent to the process by which a level of significance is
picked. To say that substantial anitcompetitive effects are "reasonably
probable" is simply to say that the probability of anticompetitive effects
is great enough that a reasonable man 9 would believe that such effects,
when they did occur, were not due to random variation.80
B. "substantially"
The question, "How much harm to competition does it take to be
substantial?" is also a judgmental issue. The analogy with the statis-
tical judgment of significance levels is even closer, here. Any harm to
75. Act of October 15, 1914, c. 1184, §§ 2, 3, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14, Section 3, unamended
since its original enactment in 1914, differs only in that, in Section 3, the infinitive is
split: "... to substantially lessen .. " This may indicate something about how gram-
matical customs change over time, but does not indicate any change in the antitrust laws.
76. This history is discussed in Brown Shoe Company v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, n.39 at 323.
77. Id.
78. See FORTUNE MAGAZINE, Editorial, Vol. 79, No. 3, March, 1969.
79. The reasonable man is a fictitious personage of great antiquity and great authority,
in the law. To say that what is reasonable is what a reasonable man would do or think
is reasonable may reasonably be regarded, in the context of antitrust law, as a clever way
to avoid being too closely tied down by a quantitatively indefinable standard.
80. Strictly, perhaps, statistical analysis will say only that the chance of some event
occurring because of random variation will be less than some specified percentage. (The
extreme purists might even restrict statistical analysis from any statement of cause what-
ever, saying only that the probability of one event occurring in the absence of another,
will be less than some specified percentage.) In using the results of statistical analysis as
a basis for making decisions, however, the decision maker must be subjectively satisfied
that the probability of one event (say some anticompetitive effect) occurring, given
another event (say, a merger) is great enough (or conversely that the probability that the
anticompetitive effect would occur solely because of random variation is small enough)
that he decides to behave as though the merger will cause the anticompetitive effect. For
one discussion of a basis for this analogy, see S. H. OZGA, EXPECTATIONS IN ECONOMIC
THEORY (1965), 49-77.
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competition which is "not insubstantial," not de minimis, which is
more than negligible, is "substantial," within the meaning of the cases
interpreting Clayton § 7.s1 If the harm is "significant," it is "substantial."
C. "competition"
The meaning of "competition" must be central to any discussion of
Section 7. No precise and explicit definition has ever been given by
the Supreme Court. The Court is not entirely at fault. It has received
little help from others-in particular, businessmen and economists.
There has been a surplus of theories of how "pure" (or "monopolistic"
or "imperfect") competition works, but there has been little analysis
in which economic theory has been held within the constraints of law.
Left to its own devices, the Supreme Court has indicated what com-
petition means in Supreme Court opinions. In Continental Can-Hazel
Atlas the Court said, ". . . we must recognize meaningful competition
where it is found to exist."'8 2 The Court has been unconcerned with
the niceties of economic theory. It searches for "competition in fact."
83
Competition, as developed by the Court, means rivalry. If A and
A B®S
P 
d bY 
-
FIGURE I
81. Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1948) see also Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320-522 (1962).
82. United States v. Continental Can Company, 378 US. 441, 449 (1964) (emphasis
added). The court held that this merger, of a leading metal can manufacturer with a
leading glass jar manufacturer, would reasonably probably eliminate meaningful inter-
product competition between the two companies. (The problematic aspect of this case
involves, not whether there was a harm to competition, but whether that harm was
substantial. See infra, note 88, note 226 and accompanying text for discussion of this.)
83. Brown Shoe Company v. United States, 370 U.S. at 326.
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B are competing to sell something to P (purchaser), or if X and Y are
competing to buy something from S (seller), then A and B are rivals,
and X and Y are rivals. It follows that there is competition in fact.
D. "in any line of commerce, in any section of the country"
Given the concept of competition as rivalry, consideration of the
relevant line of commerce and the relevant section of the country may
be ignored (at least as a preliminary matter). Any kind of economic
rivalry-competition in fact-must take place with respect to some
product or products, and must take place in time and space. The loca-
tion in space will determine the section of the country.8 4 The product
or products will determine the line of commerce. 5 If rivalry is found,
a market will be defined. If rivalry is not found, then no market will
be found.
Some difficult factual questions may arise, but one conclusion seems
reasonable: However many relevant product and geographic markets
can be plausably defined it seems a reasonable generalization from the
approach taken by the Supreme Court in Du Pont-General Motors,8 6
in Alcoa-Rome,8 7 in Continental Can-Hazel Atlas,88 and in Pabst-
84. For two cases in which this was the major analytic problem, see United States v.
Pabst Brewing Company, 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas
Company, 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
85. For two cases in which this was the major analytic problem, see United States v.
Continental Can Company, 378 U.S. 441 (1964), and United States v. Aluminum Company
of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
86. United States v. DuPont, 366 U.S. 316 (1961). 23% of the stock of General Motors
Corporation was purchased by E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Company, a manufacturer of,
Inter alia, paints and finishes. The court held that paints and finishes for automobiles
constituted a specialized product market. Given this conclusion, then General Motors
Corporation, by itself constituted a substantial portion of that market, and the potential
market foreclosed as a result of the vertical integrative influence of DuPont's stock owner-
ship was also substantial. (See Part 4, Section F, infra, for a discussion of the harm that
may result from vertical mergers.)
87. United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964). Alcoa bought
Rome Cable Company. Alcoa manufactured aluminum cable, both bare and insulated.
Rome manufactured bare and insulated copper cable, and also manufactured a small
amount of aluminum cable. Out of all possible combinations of products-bare aluminum
wire, insulated aluminum wire, all aluminum wire, and all aluminum plus all copper
wire, the court selected all (both bare and insulated, that is) aluminum wire as the
relevant market. Thus, what the merging parties probably considered a product extension
merger was held illegal on the basis of a very small overlap in corporate products.
88. United States v. Continental Can Company, 378 U.S. 441 (1964). The "market" used
to test this as a horizontal merger was combined metal and glass containers. The propriety
of adding totals of two somewhat different products, even if the products themselves are
in competition, has been questioned by a number of writers, starting with Justice Harlan's
dissent, 378 U.S. at 467. The criticism goes most strongly not to the harm to competition,
or even to the identification of the market or markets in which that harm would take
place. It goes to whether that harm is substantial. Continental Can-Hazel Atlas analyzes
the potentially harmful consequences to competition with reasonable economic sophistica-
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Blatz89 that that market definition which is least favorable to upholding
the merger in question will be adopted by the courts. The statute
provides that a merger is illegal if it may lessen competition in any
line of commerce in any section of the country." A merger therefore
violates the statute if there is even one product and geographic market
(defined by the existence of rivalry) in which competition will reason-
ably probably be substantially lessened. It is irrelevant that in other
markets the merger might have no adverse effect. It is even irrelevant
that in another market, or in various other markets, the merger might
have beneficial-procompetitive--effects. 91 The statute would still be
violated if there were one market in which competition might be sub-
stantially lessened.
The more serious problem of defining the exact boundaries of the
"market" returns after a harm to competition has been found. The
size of the market itself, has a great deal to do with the question of sub-
stantially. A harm to competition in a market which is itself de minimis,
or a harm to a de minimis proportion of a market which is even very
large, will not substantially lessen competition. The question of market
definition, therefore, while it has been conveniently disposed of as a
preliminary determination to finding a reasonably probable harm to
competition, will probably remain with us as a preliminary require-
ment to a finding that the harm is substantial. We will return to this
tion and accuracy-and this harm is not the type that would result from a typical
horizontal merger (see Section F, infra). The "can and bottle market" seems to have
arisen because the majority opinion, when it came to consider the substantiality question,
sought to "plug figures into the nearest available formula" after the manner of freshman
physics, or economics students. The nearest available formula happened to be one for
assessing the substantiality of the harm which might flow from horizontal mergers. The
substantiality question will be discussed, infra, Part 5, Section B. With respect to the
process of market selection discussed here, the authors conclude that the Court would be
equally selective about the delineation of a market if a similar case were to arise today.
89. United States v. Pabst Brewing Company, 384 U.S. 546 (1966), involved a choice of
geographic markets: Should the merger be tested in terms of its impact in the nation, in
the three state area of Wisconsin, Illinois and Michigan, or in Wisconsin alone? The
after-merger shares of Pabst-Blatz were, 4.49% in the nation, 11.32% in the three state
area and 23.95% in Wisconsin. 384 U.S. at 550-51. The court chose Wisconsin, but a
reading of the opinion convinces us that if the figures had been interchanged so that, say,
the post-merger shares were 24% in the three state area and 11% in Wisconsin, the
Court would-with easy reference to the statutory "any"-have tested the merger in the
three state area.
90. The emphasis on the word "any" occurred as early as Brown Shoe Company v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, at 325 and 337.
91. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). The defendant in
this case argued that the merger would be procompetitive, in that if would allow
penetration by a Philadelphia banking firm of the "national" market represented by the
large banks centered in New York. The Court did not dispute this; it merely regarded
the fact (assuming it were proven) as irrelevant. 374 U.S. at 368, et seq.
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later, when we consider the special problems of judging the substan-
tially of harm with respect to conglomerate mergers.
E. Why Competition?
Why is competition desirable? We explore this because the reason
behind a rule helps define and limit the situations to which the rule
will be applied.92 Congress decided to prohibit mergers which would
tend substantially to lessen competition: We have already hypothesized
that the Supreme Court means "rivalry" when its says "competition."
That merely substitutes words. Is competition desired because of short
run effects or long run effects, or is it desired for its own sake or because
of social, psychological, and/or political side effects? The kinds of harm
which will be recognized by the courts, and perhaps their judgment
of the substantiality of that harm may well depend on why the courts
conceive competition to be important-or on why the courts think
Congress conceived it to be important.
We offer our own observations, based largely on U.S. Supreme Court
opinions, but influenced to some extent by commentators.
Americans want competition, and a compatible economy, first be-
cause of the economic consequences of competition-prices at or close
to average cost, and costs as low as possible because, under competition,
suppliers are motivated to introduce cost cutting or product improving
technological and managerial changes in order to outsell competitors
(through cheaper prices) and/or make greater profits. As Richard Low
has stated:
Pure competition attains its beau ideal status because the pres-
sure of competition on each producer is such that he must con-
stantly seek new ways to cut his costs and must usually make do
with the minimum profit necessary for him to remain in business.
Thus, it scores high in regard to short term efficiency based on
cost-reduction ... 9
Competition is also desired because, under a competitive system, we
-most of us, at least-believe we have (or will have) greater economic
freedom: greater opportunities for individual entrepreneurship on our
own initiative and greater choice of things to buy and freedom from
92. We maintain this despite the fact that pointing out to a first year law class that
cessat rationale legis, cessat ipsa lex results in a predictably resounding guffaw. Perhaps
the principle suffers in translation.
93. R. Low, ANTrrrusT ECONOMICS (1968), Introduction, at 3.
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coercion as to the terms of sales: greater freedom of economic oppor-
tunity-for ourselves, both as sellers or buyers, actual and potential.9 4
These may be referred to, respectively, as competition desired for
its consequences, and competition desired for its own sake. The distinc-
tion here is relevant; if we are concerned solely with the economic
consequences of competition, then we shall take cognizance only of
those harms to competition which we can predict will have "not in-
substantial" economic consequences: increased pricing power, a signif-
icant market foreclosure, or the like. We shall also permit a showing
that a merger will result in "efficiencies"--cost savings in management,
distribution, production, or whatever-to be used as a defense in a
divestiture action; at least we will if there is any probability that such
cost savings will be passed on to consumers and become a social, as
well as a private, benefit.95
If we are concerned also with competition for its own sake, we shall
take cognizance of any merger which will "reasonably probably" inhibit
various kinds of independent action by competitors. And we may be
very concerned with the number of competitors, and with a fragmented
structure in the economy, as such, without regard to whether specific
economic consequences can be predicted.
There is abundant evidence that Congress, when it amended Section
7 in 1950, was vitally concerned not only with the economic conse-
quences of competition, but with competition for its own sake, and with
the social detriment from the absence of competition. The Supreme
Court outlined some of this history in Brown Shoe-Kinney Shoe.
The dominant theme pervading congressional consideration of
the 1950 amendments was a fear of what was considered to be a
rising tide of economic concentration in the American economy.
Apprehension in this regard was bolstered by the publication in
1948 of the Federal Trade Commission's study on corporate
mergers. Statistics from this and other current studies were cited
as evidence of the danger to the American economy in unchecked
corporate expansions through mergers. Other considerations cited
in support of the bill were the desirability of retaining 'local con-
94. Hoppman, Workable Competition, XIII ANTITRUST BULLETIN 61, 62 (1968).
95. Low, Ease of Entry: A Fundamental Economic Defense in Merger Cases 36 GEo.
WASH L. REv. 515 (1968), discusses one such defense. The possibility (and in the absence
of regulation the probability) that cost savings if an oligopoly or monopoly market will not
actually be passed on to consumers (especially where the cost savings are due to size alone
and cannot be duplicated by smaller competitors) will lead us to forego the term "effi-
ciencies" in favor of "cost savings." See FTC v. Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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trol' over industry and the protection of small businesses. Through-
out the recorded discussion may be found examples of Congress'
fear not only of accelerated concentration of economic power on
economic grounds, but also of the threat to other values a trend
toward concentration was thought to pose ....
Moreover, as we have remarked above, not only must we con-
sider the probable effects of the merger upon the economics of the
particular markets affected but also we must consider its probable
effects upon the economic way of life sought to be preserved by
Congress. Congress was desirous of preventing the formation of
further oligolopolies with their attendant adverse effects upon
local control of industry and upon small business. Where an in-
dustry was composed of numerous independent units, Congress
appeared anxious to preserve this structure.96
The concern for competition for its own sake, goes back almost to the
beginning of American antitrust law. As early as 1897, in Trans-Mis-
souri Freight Association,9 7 the Supreme Court rejected an efficiencies
defense by pointing to the long run detriment of monopoly even where
short run operating cost savings might result from a combination:
[Trusts and combinations] may even temporarily, or perhaps
permanently, reduce the price of the article traded in or manu-
factured, by reducing the expense inseparable from the running
of many different companies for the same purpose. Trade or com-
merce under those circumstances may nevertheless be badly and
unfortunately restrained by driving out of business the small
dealers and worthy men whose lives have been spent therein, and
who might be unable to readjust themselves to their altered sur-
roundings. Mere reduction in the price of the commodity dealt in
might be dearly paid for by the ruin of such a class, and the ab-
sorption of control over one commodity by an all-powerful combi-
nation of capital.9 8
And in a famous passage in his 1945 Alcoa decision, Judge Learned
Hand stated:
Throughout the history of these statutes it has been constantly
assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve,
for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of
industry in small units which can effectively compete with each
other.9
96. Brown Shoe Company v. United States, 370 US. 294, 315-316, 333.
97. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
98. Id. at 323.
99. United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
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More recently, in interpreting Section 7 in merger cases, the Supreme
Court has made it clear that it believes Congress intended to protect and
preserve not only the economic consequences of competition, but com-
petition for its own sake.
First, the court has said so, in almost identical language in Brown
Shoe-Kinney Shoe,100 and, more recently, in Procter & Gamble-Clorox:
Possible economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality.
Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen competition
may also result in economies but it struck the balance in favor of
protecting competition. See Brown Shoe Company v. United States,
370 U.S. at 344.101
Second, the ultimate test of harm to competitors has tended more and
more to be stated in terms of barriers to entry,10 2 and decreased ease
of competitive action by independent (which seems to carry the added
connotation of "small") firms. 103
"Barriers to entry" may be connected to purely economic conse-
quences of competition, as Justice Harlan has recently done, laboriously,
in Procter & Gamble-Clorox:
Two justifications for the use of entry barriers as a determinant
under Section 7 can be given. The first is that an increased range
over which pricing power may be exercised is contrary to the man-
date of Section 7 because Congress' use of the word 'competition'
was a shorthand for the invocation of the benefits of a competitive
market, one of which is a price close to average cost. Such an ap-
proach leads also to the conclusion that economic efficiencies pro-
duced by the merger must be weighed against anticompetitive
consequences in the final determination whether the net effect on
competition is substantially adverse .... The second justification
is found in the tendency to monopoly clause of Section 7. Certainly
the clearest evil of monopoly is the excessive power the monopolist
has over price. Since 'antitrust operates to forestall concentrations
of economic power which, if allowed to develop unhindered, would
call for much more intrusive government supervision of the
economy, Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COL. L. REV.
377, 383, increased power over price should be attackable under
Section 7. Cf. S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 4-5.104
100. Brown Shoe Company v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
101. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Company, 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967).
102. Id. at 579.
103. Id. see also Brown Shoe Company v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 343-346.
104. 386 US. 568, 596-597.
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The interpretation of barriers to entry by the majority in Procter &
Gamble-Clorox was quite different, however, and shows the Court's con-
cern with competition not merely as a means to an end but as an end
to be valued in itself:
The acquisition may also have the tendency of raising the bar-
riers to new entry. The major competitive weapon in the successful
marketing of bleach is advertising. Clorox was limited in this area
by its relatively small budget and its inability to obtain substantial
discounts. By contrast, Procter's budget was much larger; and al-
though it would not devote its entire budget to advertising Clorox,
it could divert a large portion to meet the short-term threat of a
new entrant. Procter would be able to use its volume discounts
to advantage in advertising Clorox, it could divert a large portion
to meet the short-term threat of a new entrant. Procter would be
able to use its volume discounts to advantage in advertising Clorox.
Thus, a new entrant would be much more reluctant to face the
giant Procter than it would have been to face the smaller Clorox.'°5
(Emphasis supplied.)
"Barriers to entry," which we have identified with a value given
to competition as an end in itself, can of course be linked to economic
consequences of competition in ways other than the way Justice Harlan
has suggested. In fact it is rather surprising that so few have made this
link. 08 When we speak of entry by new firms, new entrepreneurs, we
are speaking of new investment. In traditional microeconomic theory
the distinction between the short run and the long run has been that
in the short run real capital investment is fixed; whereas in the long
run new real capital, new plant and equipment, can be brought into a
production process. 10 7
More specifically, the economic long run is a time sufficiently long
that fixed costs can be regarded as variable. The tendency of particular
markets to approach equilibrium positions where price will equal
average costs (including normal profits),' 08 and where average costs
will approach the minimum average costs of the most efficient sized
105. Id. at 579, Emphasis supplied.
106. With the rather notable exception of J. S. BAIN, BAmuERS TO NEW CoMPETrrION
(1956).
107. C. FERGUSON, MICROECONOMIc THEORY (2d Ed. 1968). Ch. 8 and 9; COHEN & CYERT,
THEORY OF THE FIRM (1965) Ch.8.
108. "Normal" profits are profits sufficiently high to keep a producer in the business,
but not high enough to attract additional producers into the business, in the absence of
an increase in demand. See W. BAUMEL., ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS (2d
Ed., 1965) 315-316.
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firm or plant, is a tendency that will be observed only where entry is
reasonably easy.10 9 The existence of "reasonable ease of entry" will de-
pend on whether the criteria for making (or not making) an investment
are unduly influenced by factors irrelevant to efficiency. Investment
decisions will normally depend on whether expected revenues will
justify known present, and expected future, costs, with both future
revenues and future costs discounted to present values. 10 If there are
alternatives, then that alternative which maximizes net returns will
(or should) be selected."'
Particular market structures may "distort" the expectations of poten-
tial entrants, or even of firms considering expansion, by making their
expectations depend on factors irrelevant to production costs, real
product quality, and consumer tastes based on knowledge of true
109. COHEN AND CYERT, supra note 107, Ch. 8; FERGUSON, supra note 107, Ch. 9 at 210-14.
Most economic literature will specify that entry must be "free." There will usually be
some costs-e.g. investment costs-attached to entry. To obtain the kinds of long run
economic benefits we associate with competition, it is probably sufficient that entry is
reasonably easy, and that barriers unrelated to efficiency and other economically desirable
factors not dominate such decisions. Low, supra note 95, conditions such that existing
firms in the industry, smaller than optimum size, can expand could, conceivably, take the
place of entry-though one would expect the two sets of conditions to be nearly identical.
110. For a brief description of the mathematics of computing present values see
HENDERSON & QUANDT, MICROECONOMIc THEORY (1958), Ch. 8, especially pp. 223-229, or
BIERMAN AND SMIDT, THE CAPITAL BUDGETING DECISION (2d Ed., 1966). For a fuller descrip-
tion of the investment decision, see note 111, infra.
111. In deciding whether to make a given investment, one may, as suggested in the text,
make that investment which maximizes the present value of all returns from the invest-
ment, net of the present value of all costs of the investment. See J. W. CONARD, AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF INTEREST (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1959);
BIERMAN AND SMIDT, supra note 110. In long run terms, this is the equivalent of profit
maximization in the short run-the maximization of net gain-and is considered, in
conventional economic theory, to be the only rational method of making an investment
decision. COHEN & CYERT, supra note 107; BIERMAN AND SMIDT, supra note 110. In practice,
it is seldom used. The government uses a benefit to cost ratio, and thus ranks alternative
projects in such a way as to maximize the rate of return. 0. ECKSTEIN, WATER RESOURCES
DEvELOPMENT (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1958); R. McKEAN, EFFICIENCY IN
GOVERNMENT THROUGH SYSTEMS ANALYSIS (1958). When the rate of return is discounted, as
it is in government benefit-cost studies, it will inform one accurately and rationally
whether there is a net gain or a net loss from the investment. Inconsistencies between
present value and discounted rate of return analysis arise only when ranks alternative
investments that have different lifetimes and/or different patterns of return over time (as
will usually be the case for government investments).
Businessmen commonly use as criteria the rate of return on their own invested funds,
and/or the "payback period"-the time it takes to return their own invested capital.
M. SOLOMON, INvESTMENT DECISIONS IN SMALL BUSINESS (University of Kentucky Press,
Lexington, 1963) 57-58. Solomon argues that in the context of the uncertainties involved
in making actual decisions, these criteria are not irrational: In most cases, collecting the
additional information necessary to apply the present value analysis meaningfully would
cost more than would be gained from using present value instead of payback period
analysis. Most important among these uncertainties are the expected revenue-which
usually depends on the expected size of the market-and the length of life of the in-
vestment. Of these two, by far the greatest uncertainty attaches to the expected revenues.
Id., 57-58, 85-92.
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product quality. Such irrelevant factors might include the power of
other firms (e.g. big conglomerates) to close off markets, by any means
considered reasonably probable, whether legal (vertical integration by
merger or expansion, or product differentiation) or illegal (tie-ins, or
exclusive dealing contracts); or they might include cost advantages of
other firms (such as capital access, volume discounts, or advertising dis-
counts). If, for any reason, a small independent or potential entering
firm fears that access to a market (any market) for his output can be
arbitrarily cut off, he may well decide to invest available funds in
something else.112 We will discuss some of these reasons in connection
with specific sorts of harm to, or lessening of, competition, infra."'
To the extent that the expectations of potential entrants are distorted,
their investment decisions will not be conducive to the long run purely
economic consequences of competition.
In fact, when we talk about some of the benefits of "competition for
its own sake" we may well be talking about long run economic con-
sequences. Freedom of economic opportunity, for example, refers to
conditions such that if someone has an idea (even, e.g., for a better
mousetrap) it is possible for him to try out that new idea. It increases
our sense of freedom to know that if we do have an idea we can try it
out-and this increased sense of freedom may legitimately be regarded
as a value in and of itself, regardless of whether any other, more purely
"economic" good ever comes of it.
The long run economic consequences, however, are that people are
more likely to put forth the effort to invent or develop new products
or production processes if they are likely to be able to try them out.
The easier the entry, the more likely it is that an inventor will be able
to try out his invention. The greater is freedom of economic oppor-
tunity, other things being equal, the greater the likelihood that people
will take advantage of that economic opportunity. Pluralism in eco-
nomic affairs, just as in political affairs, is widely believed to produce
good results. If there are too few decision makers, good ideas may never
be tried (or perhaps never even thought of) simply for lack of a chance
112. A non-rational factor which affects many business decisions, of course, is the
experience and background of the decision maker. One whose experience is in retail
and wholesale clothing will perhaps be a little hesitant to invest in tool & die making
equipment, and vice versa. Id. 57-68. This factor affects only certain individual investors
who might otherwise consider entry, however, it would not be a general factor affecting
all potential entrants, and would not be expected to have general market influence.
113. Part 4, Section F, and Part 5, Section A(l).
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to try them out. The greater the number of people searching for im-
provements in products and production processes, the more likely such
improvements are to come about.
It has been claimed, of course, that innovation, under conditions
where the technology of research and development has become so com-
plex, and expensive, requires large, even very large, industrial firms
for support.11 4 Large firms, on the other hand, may have large invest-
ments in existing technology, which they will not want to make obsolete
by introducing radically new inventions. This suggests that large firms
will be more likely to support and develop minor improvements and
modifications of existing products and production processes, rather than
inventions which call for replacements. Some empirical research sup-
ports the hypothesis suggested above-the more inventors, the more
inventions. As the F.T.C. Conglomerate Merger Report notes:
[A] large proportion of radical new concepts such as xerography,
polaroid cameras, and catalytic cracking of petroleum is the prod-
uct of the creative individual-the individual who typically pur-
sues relentlessly the unconventional idea even though it involves
a high risk that the effort will be unsuccessful. 115 As a result of
such risk, it is contended, the manager and technical staff of very
large corporations will typically be conservative in their approach
to solving particular problems, thereby making a less than propor-
tional contribution in terms of major inventions. Thus, institu-
tionalized invention at a large corporate research laboratory is
unlikely to generate significant deviations from conventional
practice.116
We shall lump the various long run economic consequences with the
independent value which the Supreme Court has accorded to com-
petition as a value in itself. In this, we follow the Court's practice.
On occasion we shall analyze the long run economic effects separately.
114. J. SCHUMPErER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (Harper & Row, New
York, 1942), especially Ch. 7.
115. [Renumbered FTC CONGLOMERATE MERGER REPORT footnote]. The studies of
inventive activity by JEWKES, SAWERS, AND STILLERMAN, THE SOURCES OF INVENTION, (St.
Martin's Press, 1958) and by Mueller, The Origins of the Basic Inventions Underlying Du-
Pont's Major Product and Process Innovations, 1920 to 1950, THE RATE AND DIRECTION
OF INVENTIVE AcrIVITY. (Princeton Univ. Press, 1962). Both studies found that over half
the important products of processes had been developed by single inventors or others
working outside leading corporations.
116. FTC CONGLOMERATE MERGER REPORT at 90. For example, DuPont, "often con-
sidered a highly inventive and innovative firm, has obtained most of its basic inventions
and processes from outside sources." Instead of making basic inventions, DuPont has made
improvements on other people's basic inventions. Id. at 92, citing MUELLER, supra note 115.
275
Duquesne Law Review
In giving an independent status to competition for its own sake,
we admit that Congress' action in 1950 was not completely clear and
that historically, Congress has not been entirely consistent in its con-
cern for competition for its own sake." 7 We admit, as we have already
noted, that at least one member of the Supreme Court, Justice Harlan,
does not agree that competition should be protected for its own sake. 18
It may nevertheless be predicted that the Supreme Court will continue
to give weight to "reasonably probable" effects of any mergers which
come before it on competition as such, as well as to the "reasonably
probable" effects on the economic consequences of competition.
And we think such action by the Courts is not bad law, or even
necessarily bad economics." 9 The evidence may not be overwhelming
that Congress cared about competition for its own sake as well as for
both its short and long run consequences; but evidence does exist, and
to ignore that evidence entirely, or to regard it as being irrelevant,
seems unjustified.
In a nation which has shown itself willing to pay heavily for political
freedom,120 it seems reasonable to believe, as does the Supreme Court,
that Congress believed that economic freedom was worth paying for-
with the price being measured in "occasional higher costs of produc-
tion" and, implicitly, possible higher prices.121 Indeed, in a world
where social choices cannot produce complete Pareto optimality122 (and
117. See, e.g., the retail price maintainance provisions of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
118. See, e.g., Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Com-
pany, 386 U.S. 568, 581 et seq., quoted in part, supra, at note 192.
119. With all due respect to Professor Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of
The Clayton Act 78 HAR. L. REV. 1313, 1323 (1965), who disgrees.
120. In two World Wars in this century alone, as well as two undeclared wars over
the political independence of people of difference cultures 8,000 miles away, one of which
is still being fought.
121. Brown Shoe Company v. United States, 370 U.S. at 315-16.
122. FERGUSON, MICROECONoMIc THEORY (2d Ed. 1968) Chapter 14; HENDERSON AND
QUANDT, MICROECONOMIc.THEORY (1958), Chapter K; ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL
VALuEs (Revised Ed., 1963). Pareto optimality (named after an Italian economist who
developed some of the basic concepts of general equilibrium) is defined as a state of
resource allocation and use, such that no individual can improve his position (with
respect to consumption and/or production) without some other individual's position being
worsened. An improvement in social welfare (because, e.g., of increased production due
to private or governmental investment, or because of technological changes in production
or distribution) is considered to be unambiguous if and only if at least one person is
made better off and no person is made worse off. It has been proven (see FERGUSON, and
HENDERSON and QUANDT, above) that under conditions of perfect competition (many
sellers, many buyers-an "atomistic" market, that is-homogeneous products, free entry
and exit of resources, perfect knowledge, plus consumers motivated solely by personal
utility maximization and producers motivated solely by profit maximization), Pareto
optimality will prevail. Unfortunately, few of the assumptions of perfect competition are
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realizing that Pareto optimality is at best a low level criterion of how
well an economic system functions), it may even have been wise as a
matter of economics for Congress to have attached a positive value to
competition as such, making its (not necessarily everyone's) choice of
the best among all possible Second-Best alternatives.'.-
F. "To lessen competition": Types of Harm
For convenience we will examine the types of harm recognized by
the courts, independently of any questions with regard to the substan-
tiality of that harm. These may be classified broadly into two categories:
First, is the sort of harm which results from a horizontal merger-
the elimination of one or more competitors in a field, and a change in
the relative sizes of firms in a field. Second, is the sort of harm that
results from a vertical merger-the closing off of markets (product
market or factor market or both) because of considerations of corporate
ever fully satisfied in real life. Even if some were approximately satisfied, problems would
arise due to imperfect knowledge, and to the impossibility of explaining human behavior
by any single motivating factor.
The assertion that social choice cannot be made in such a way as to produce Pareto
optimality rests in part on imperfections in the processes of social decision making, ex-
plored by ARROW. It rests, also, in part on the existence of known perversities in man's
nature, and of perceived inequities in the distribution of resources. As long as one con-
sumer's satisfaction depends in part on what his neighbor consumes (e.g., liquor, or
"too much," or "too little') or upon what other producers produce, then any alteration
in the distribution or type of consumption or production is likely to interfere with
achievement of Pareto optimality. An extreme on the production side might be
monopoly: if monopoly exists, the distribution of productive facilities (in the absence
of a growth in demand) cannot be altered without lowering the monopolist's profits, and
thereby his (consumer) satisfaction. Even at a less extreme point, a consumer's satisfaction
may depend in part on what he, in his capacity as a producer, produces, and indirectly
on what others produce. It is very satisfying to "produce," for example, a 4 minute
mile; but is is not nearly so satisfying if someone else can "produce" a 3 minute 55 second
mile. Competitive satisfaction or dissatisfaction of this sort is not quite so clearly visible
in more obviously economic sorts of production activities, but is probably never com-
pletely absent. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH (The Mac-
millan Company, New York, 1959), and KONRAD LORENTZ, ON AGGRESSION (Harcourt,
Brace & World, New York, 1967).
123. It has been proven, mathematically that if any one condition for Pareto optimality
is not met, the allocation of resources resulting from satisfying the remaining conditions
will not, in general, be the most optimal "second best" alternative to Pareto optimality.
Lancaster, and Lipsey, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REVIEW OF EcONOMICS AND
STATISTICS 11 (1942). In fact, where the departures from the ideal of perfect competition
vary from industry to industry and from place to place, there may well be no demon-
strable second best alternative. See E. MISHAN, WELFARE ECONOMIES (1964) at 79-80, and
works there cited. In this case (and perhaps in any case) it can hardly be considered ir-
rational to attach some value, some positive (consumer-type) utility, to the existence of a
fragmented industrial structure. Such a structure may give satisfaction in and of itself,
to many people, completely apart from any goods which may be produced.
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relationship, reciprocal buying or tie-in pressure, or any other similar
relationships.
Every merger case before the Supreme Court since Brown Shoe-
Kinney Shoe124 has involved relationships between merging parties
which the parties themselves did not regard as typically horizontal or
vertical. Philadelphia Bank-Girard Trust 25 could be viewed as a geo-
graphic market extension merger, in that it permitted penetration of
nationwide banking markets; and was tested (and rejected) as a horizon-
tal merger by the Supreme Court. The Continental Can-Hazel Atlas126
and Alcoa-Rome127 mergers broadened product lines into closely re-
lated fields-so closely related that they were held to be the same line
of commerce, allowing the court to treat them as horizontal mergers.
Even Pabst-Blatz128 and Vons Stores-Shopping Bag129 involved signif-
icant geographic market extension aspects; El Paso-Pacific Northwest 30
and Penn-Olin'3' involved even more significant geographic market ex-
tension aspects. Nevertheless all four of these were treated essentially
as horizontal mergers.
Consolidated Foods-Gentry'32 and Procter & Gamble-Clorox"33 were
even further removed from the range of ordinary horizontal and ver-
tical mergers Nevertheless, the types of harm to competition in these
cases can be referred to as vertical or horizontal, respectively.
1. Horizontal Merger, Two Firm Industry
Analyzing the problem of anticompetitive effects schematically, sup-
124. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
125. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). See note 91, supra.
126. 378 U.S. 441 (1964). See note 88, supra.
127. 377 U.S. 271 (1964). See note 87, supra.
128. 384 U.S. 546 (1966). See note 89, supra.
129. United States v. Vons Grocery Company, 384 U.S. 270 (1966). The lower court,
and Justice Stewart in his dissent, 384 U.S. at 295-296, emphasized that Vons stores and
Shopping Bag stores operated supermarkets scattered through the Los Angeles area in
such a way that Vons stores did not actually compete with Shopping Bag stores in any
particular neighborhood. The merger could, therefore, be viewed by Vons as a way of
"filling in holes," extending Vons' geographic market area into a number of neighborhoods
where Vons did not do business.
130. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Company, 376 U.S. 651 (1964). See note 119,
infra, and accompanying text.
131. United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Company, 378 U.S. 158 (1964). See note 120,
infra, and accompanying text.
132. FTC v. Consolidated Foods, 380 U.S. 592 (1965). Consolidated Foods Corporation,
a manufacturer and seller of a broad line of food products here acquired Gentry, Inc.,
a manufacturer of dehydrated onion and garlic. The merger involved the possibility (and
apparently also the actuality) of reciprocal dealing. See note 126, infra, and accompanying
text, for further discussion of reciprocity in general, and this case in particular.
133. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Company, 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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pose A and B compete to sell to P (purchaser), or X and Y compete
to buy from S (seller).
AB
P
0
x y
FIGURE II
Apart from questions of substantiality, 13 4 a horizontal merger between
A and B, or between X and Y will eliminate (and thereby lessen)
competition.
FIGURE III
2. Vertical Merger
Similarly, a vertical merger between, say, A and P may, foreclose the
entire market. In the extreme case, where P is the only purchaser and A
134. Which will be dealt with specifically, in relation to conglomerate mergers, in
Part V (B), infra.
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can expand to satisfy all of P's wants, such a vertical merger will
"reasonably probably" eliminate B's entire market, thereby eliminating
B, and eliminating (and thus lessening) competition. A vertical merger
between, X and S will, by paralled arguments, reasonably probably
eliminate (and thereby lessen) competition by eliminating Y as a
competitor.
P x Y
FicuRE IV
To some extent the adverse economic consequences of vertical mer-
gers, it must be recognized, are associated only with long run phenom-
ena:135 Markets will be foreclosed only if the output of the selling
135. Professor Bork has argued that vertical mergers cannot cause any economic
damage, and that the contrary assertion involves double counting. Bork, Antitrust in
Dubious Battle, FORTUNE Vol. LXXX, No. 4 (1969), p. 103. Double counting arises, he
claims, because when a firm has market power in one stage of production, merges with
a firm without market power in another stage of production, it cannot simultaneously
use its market power in both stages of production-in both markets.
Of course, his argument depends on the hypothesis that the acquired firm operates in
a completely competitive market. This is unlikely. (FTC CONGLOMERATE MERGER REPORT
248-249); for one example of concentration in geographic markets where the industry,
nationwide does not show such high concentration, See BuREAu Or ECONOMICS, STAFF RE-
PORT TO THE FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON MERGERS & VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN THE CEMENT
INDusTRY. (U.S. Gov't. Printing Office, Washington, April, 1969).
Aside from its lack of realism, however( and even if Professor Bork's factual assumption
is correct in a particular case), his argument seems to place too much emphasis on con-
ventional economic theory. If a 2-stage vertically integrated firm simultaneously tries to
maximize short run profits in both stages, then what he says is true. If the firm follows
a long run strategy, however, it may try to shave profits, and prices, in the competitive
stage of production, in order to possibly gain market power there.
His argument also depends on a complete and total adherence by the firm to profit
maximization as a goal. If there is any departure from that, then his conclusion fails. For
example, if the firm maximizes revenue, then it would logically seek to reduce prices in
the competitive market-even at the cost of of reducing overall profits, within the con-
straint that profits should not fall below some acceptable minimum-in order to maximize
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firm in a vertical merger can be expanded to satisfy all of the demands
of the buying firm in such a merger; and this may well occur only if
(1) there is slack capacity in the industry (or more specifically, in the
selling firm), or (2) if new capital investment in machinery and equip-
ment is to be made after the merger. In case of any change in produc-
tion, either because of a shift in demand, or because of replacement
or new investment in production equipment, the merged firm will try
to expand its own internal self-sufficiency, decreasing its dependence
upon rival firms. It can do this by increasing the production of the
division which is at the earlier, "selling" stage of production, to the
point where the integrated firm "buys" only from itself. The result
of this will be that competitors of the (former) selling firm of a ver-
tically merged corporation will find that when they calculate potential
demand, they must subtract the demand of the integrated firm from
the total demand for their product. In the long run, this will mean
capital investment is made only (or at a minimum, at a greater rate)
in the vertically merged firm.
We note three potential side effects of vertical mergers: (1) Indepen-
dent firms may feel forced to enter into other vertical mergers in order
to preserve their existence-a vertical merger may "trigger other mer-
gers."'136 (2) The fact that the merger "artificially" reduces the total
competitive demand for the product of the selling firm in the vertically
merged corporation (by the amount of the purchases of the buying firm,
in the long run) creates a barrier to entry by new firms, and may force
smaller existing firms out of business. 137 (3) The process of triggering
total sales within both markets. W. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH
(1959), see especially Ch's 6-8; CYERT & COHEN, supra note 107 at 376. Or if the firm
sought to make its position more secure (or its managers, perhaps, sought to make their
positions more secure), then it might, in a declining or fluctuating market, seek to assure
a market by buying one. As the FTC ECONOMIC REPORT ON MERGERS AND VERTICAL IN-
TEGRATION IN THE CEMENT INDUSTRY, supra, commented, at 98:
It appears that the primary purpose of forward vertical acquisition by cement manu-
facturers has been to secure captive consumers and to protect market outlets from
the inroads of aggressive competition on the part of rivals. Both the timing and
method of vertical integration by cement manufacturers support this conclusion;
integration was accomplished through acquisition of established ready mixed facilities,
for the most part since 1960 . . . .In most instances the firms acquired were among
the leading concrete manufacturers in their particular markets and were com-
paratively large cement consumers.
It turned out, after merger, that the ready-mixed concrete divisions of the merged com-
panies bought most of their portland cerment from the parent. Id. at 100.
136. This has been raised more frequently in conglomerate merger cases than in ver-
tical merger cases. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Company, 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
137. For a good discussion of the results of foreclosure, see Justice Harlan's opinion,
dissenting in part, in Brown Shoe Company v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 369-373 (1962).
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other mergers, added to the absence of entry, and/or the process of
independent firms going out of existence (in the long run) may mean
that a vertical merger may result (again in the long run) in the transfer
of an oligopoly market structure from one level of production to an-
other.
3. Horizontal Merger, Multi-Firm Industry
Suppose there are three sellers of equal size, A, B, and C; and A and
B merge. Competion has not been eliminated, but there are now two
competitors instead of three and any competitive balance between A,
B, and C has been destroyed.
OO®C KD
FIGURE V
As to the number of competitors, economic theory does not really
tell us much about the difference in functioning between a market with
n competitors and a market with n-1 competitors (unless n = 1 or 2,
or unless n is so large that the difference is predictably zero). At the
most simplistic level, competition between the merging companies will
be eliminated, and therefore competition will be lessened.13 Further,
it seems reasonable, in terms of the behavioral analysis of oligopoly, to
expect that the probability of collusion, or conscious parallelism, be-
comes greater as the number of competitors become smaller. 30 Also,
as the size differential between various firms in the same market be-
138. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Company v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 335.
139. Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts-From Economic
Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REV. 285 (1967). COHEN AND CYERT, THEORY OF THE
FLR (1965), Chapters 12 and 13.
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comes greater, it is also reasonable to expect the probability of such
noncompetitive market performance characteristics as price leadership
to become greater. 140 Therefore, in terms of the consequences of com-
petition, harm to competition seems reasonably probable in a case
where two of three equally balanced competitors merge.
In terms of competition for its own sake, such a merger will decrease
apparent economic freedom by changing a field of three reasonably
balanced competitors to a field of two firms, one twice as big as the
other. Because of the increased financial staying power and the in-
creased market power 141 of the big firm, some, perhaps most, forms of
independent competitive action by C will be much more difficult after
he is confronted with a combined A plus B. Price competition, at least,
will be more difficult for C, simply because of the financial staying
power of A plus B-the larger firm could sell even at a loss, and hold
out longer than C.142 Other competitive behavior may also be harder.
Mounting an intensive sales campaign may be undertaken only with
trepidation, if the response on the part of one's competitor may be
overwhelming because of (1) general financial strength and consequent
ability to concentrate resources on some one aspect of competitive ac-
tivity,' 43 or (2) the larger firm's ability to get advertising discounts or
favorable "shelf space allocation," or both.144 The only competitive be-
havior which will probably not be affected is real product improvement
and technological advances in production; even here, the smaller com-
pany may realistically fear the potential retaliative force of the larger
140. COHEN AND CYERT, supra note 139 at 241-49.
141. Cf. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 FTC 944 (1962).
142. Id., at 1059-1060. See also the description of the Safeway supermarket chain price
war in Dallas and El Paso, 1954-1955, in BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, STAFF REPORT TO THE
FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON THE STRUCTURE AND COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR OF FOOD RE-
TAILING (U.S. Gov't. Printing Office, Washington, 1966) 121-142. •
143. See, e.g., the description of Purex' experience when it tried to increase its share
of the Buffalo market in competition with the merged Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568, 595
(1967). This "massing of resources" is the "deep pocket" effect which has been made the
basis of the decision only in one court case, FTC v. Reynolds Metals Company, 309 F.2d
223 (D. C. Cir. 1962), and in no Supreme Court case. The opinion in the Reynolds case,
however, was written by Warren E. Berger, Jr., now Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court. It should be noted that the Procter & Gamble case dealt with a con-
glomerate merger, and that the Reynolds case dealt with a vertical merger. Safeway (see
note 142, supra.) was also a conglomerate, in the sense that it operated in more than one
market.
Any company operating in more than one markef probably has fuller opportunities
for massing of resources than a large firm operating in only one market. Because of this,
the effect of size disparity is more than proportional when the giant is a conglomerate.
See Part 5, Section A(1), infra. for discussion.)
144. See, FTC v. Procter & Gamble Company, 386 US. 568 (1967), and U.S. v. Wilson
Sporting Goods Company, 288 F. Supp. 543 (N. D. Illinois 1968).
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firm's decisive advantages with respect to other forms of competition. 145
In terms of long run economic effects, a decision by C to expand
production, or even to renew or replace worn out equipment, will be
inhibited because of all the difficulties that put C at a disadvantage
in the short run.
The mere fact of the introduction of a giant into a field otherwise
occupied by pygmies does have harmful competitive effects. The story
of David and Goliath is memorable and stirring at least in part because
the spirit of David is so rare. It may be remembered that among all the
people of Israel, there was only one David.146 Should we expect that
there will be more among modern businessmen?
These imbalance factors will affect C's competitive behavior by
making C apprehensive of the consequences of vigorous competitive
assertiveness. A fortiori, the same imbalance factors will make new entry
by independent entrepreneurs unlikely. Such entry, almost inevitably
involving "starting out small," is perhaps the ultimate expression of
independent competitive assertiveness. The effect on the long run
economic consequences of competition are even more obvious when
we consider the outsider making a decision as to whether to try to
break in. While it may be true that entry by a large firm through in-
ternal expansion will not be inhibited, the fact that entry by small
independent entrepreneurs will be severely inhibited should be a suf-
ficient harm under the statute. 4
4. Summary
The possibility of harm resulting from a merger between two of a
relatively small number of competitors can be summarized as follows:
(1) Competition between the two will be eliminated.
(2) Whatever concentration existed in the industry before will be
intensified.
(3) An imbalance or disparity in size may be created or intensified.
Because of these,
(a) Oligopoly patterns of pricing and other competitive behavior
may be produced or intensified.
(b) Entry barriers will be increased and the forces making for
145. See, FTC v. Procter & Gamble Company, 386 U.S. 568 (1967). For a contrary view,
see Justice Harlan's concurring opinion, 386 Us. at 581.
146. 1 Samuel, Chapter 17.
147. See, notes 121 and 122, supra, and quotations from FTC v. Procter & Gamble
Company, accompanying them.
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independent competitive behavior by smaller firms will
weaken.
The effects of a vertical merger in a market with several buyers
and/or sellers are not materially different from the effects in a market
with three parties, already analyzed. The anti-competitive effects are
the possible or probable foreclosure of all or some share of a market or
a source of supply, with consequent inhibitory effects on the range of
free competitive action by independent firms, on freedom of entry,
and in the long run with damaging economic effects as a result of
shifting possible industrial concentration from one level of production
to another. These effects will be further explored in connection with
the problem of reciprocity power.
V. SECTION 7 AS APPLIED TO CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
We have examined the current merger movement, and the special
significance of 1968 in that movement. We have explored the meaning
of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, generally, as it might apply to horizontal
or vertical mergers. The current merger wave, however, has become a
wave of conglomerate mergers. 148
We therefore examine the application of Clayton § 7 to conglomerate
mergers. There are only two problems of application which are peculiar
to conglomerate, as distinguished from horizontal and vertical mergers:
the definition of the type of harm to competition which may result
from a conglomerate merger, and the determination of the substantial-
ity of that harm. What we mean by "may", what we mean by "competi-
tion"-and the values we hope to promote by preventing a substantial
lessening of competition-and what we mean by "market", do not
change. The delineation of a product and geographic market, within
which to measure substantiality, may be more difficult when we deal
with conglomerate mergers, but the nature of the market definition is
not different from that used in analyzing horizontal and vertical mergers.
By definition, direct competition, and direct buyer-seller relation-
ships between the merging firms are lacking in conglomerate mergers.
A. The Basic Types of Harm, Applied to Conglomerate Mergers
What if D, a corporation not previously in the same product or
geographic market as A or B, merges with A?
148. Especially in 1968. See Part II, supra.
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FIGuRE VI
Whether this makes any difference to competition depends on who D
is, and involves questions of substantiality as we consider the possibility
of an effect on competition. Keeping in mind that we are making no
judgment of how large the effect is, let us consider some possibilities
for harm.
1. Relative Bigness
If D is a large corporation relative to the size of the market in which
A and B are selling, then the evenness of the competition between A
and B (now D and B) will be affected by the mere fact that D is a giant
relative to B. As Corwin D. Edwards said, in a frequently quoted pas-
sage:
In encounters with small enterprises it can buy scarce materials
and attractive sites, inventions, and facilities; preempt the services
of the most expensive technicians and executives; and acquire re-
serves of materials for the future. It can absorb losses that would
consume the entire capital of a smaller rival . . . moment by mo-
ment the big company can outbid, outspend, or outlose the small
one; and from a series of such momentary advantages it derives
an advantage in attaining its large aggregate results.
149
A conglomerate, operating in different product and/or geographic
markets, can, if the markets are reasonably well insulated from each
other, finance losses in one market from profits in another market or
149. C. EnwARs, Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power, in BusINr.sS CONCENTRA-
TION AND PmicE PoLicY (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1955) 334-335.
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other markets. (We shall adopt the term used in the FTC Conglomerate
Merger, Report, "cross subsidization," for this process.) If all of the
markets in which the conglomerate operates are competitive markets,
then the opportunities for such cross subsidization may be limited. 50
Most of the large conglomerates of the 1960's (and early 1970's) do not
operate entirely in competitive markets--one, or usually several, of
their markets are oligopolistic in some degree.' 5' Oligolopy profits will
therefore be available in most cases to support branches of the corporate
operation which need subsidizing for some reason. The reason may be
legitimate, as might be the case with a regional recession or a drop in
demand for one product, or it might be legally questionable. 152
Of the three cases that the FTC Conglomerate Merger Report ana-
lyzes in detail, the National Dairy-Kraft case, dealing with a 50%
promotional price cut to dealers, is perhaps the most striking. 53 Kraft,
as a seller of jams and jellies, entered the Baltimore-Washington-Rich-
mond-Norfolk market in 1956. As pointed out in the FTC Report:
By 1960, Kraft was a major supplier in this four-city area. Its sales
volume there was $475,129. The sales of its three leading indepen-
dent regional competitors were as follows: Old Virginia, $1,462,195;
Theresa Friedman (95 percent private label), $644,569; and Po-
laner, $339,868.154 The sales of Old Virginia in the four-city area
represented about 39 percent of its total sales for 1960, whereas
150. See FTC CONGLOMERATE MERGER REPORT at 398, 403, where conflicting views on
the theoretical question are discussed.
151. Id. The Report's conclusion is that while there may be an argument over the
question of whether large size alone can confer the power to cross subsidize, in practice
most multimarket firms do operate in oligopoly markets, where they can reap oligopoly
profits, in some markets. See also Tables 4-1 and 4-2, Id. at 218 and 220.
152. The effectiveness of cross subsidization will not depend on whether the purpose
is legal or illegal. The only difference may be that illegal cross subsidization can be ar-
ranged to suit the convenience of the conglomerate practicing it, and possibly to suit the
inconvenience of the victims. Illegal cross subsidization may be, therefore, faster and more
certain in its accomplishments; this advantage may even be great enough to overcome the
risk of getting caught. It is true that two earlier studies of predatory pricing, Adelman,
The A & P Case: A Study in Applied Economic Theory, 63 QUARTERLY JOURNAL' OF ECONOMICS
238 (1949), and McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 JOURNAL
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 137 (1958), question whether predatory price cutting has ever
or ever can actually occur. The FTC does not regard these studies as conclusive, and
cites extensive literature to the contrary, in a nearly 3 page footnote, FTC CONGLOMERATE
MERGER REPORT at 403-405. We do not here take a position on the A & P or Standard
Oil cases. The number of other cases of cross subsidization cited in the FTC CONGLOM-
ERATE MERGER REPORT convinces us that cross subsidization, even if not predatory pricing
in the narrow sense, has occurred. See, e.g., the National Daity Case, discussed next,
infra.
153. FTC CONGLOMERATE MERGER REPORT 432-443. The other two were (1) the Safeway
Supermarket chain price war, in El Paso and Dallas in 1954-1955 (see note 142, supra),
and (2) the Anheuser-Busch disciplinary price cut in St. Louis in 1954-1955. Id., at 406-431.
154. FTC footnotes omitted.
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Kraft's sales there were approximately 3.5 percent of its national
sales of jams and jellies and .03 percent of National Dairy's total
sales. Kraft's sales into the four-city area were concentrated in
Baltimore, where it made 67 percent of its four-city sales; it made
only 8 percent in Washington, D.C.
Dissatisfied with its share of the Washington market, Kraft de-
cided upon an "all out" program to improve sales. During the 26-
day period from January 16 through February 10, 1961, Kraft
offered the trade one case free with every case of jams and jellies
purchased at list price, the free cases to be delivered after the close
of the promotion on February 10. The only limits to the quantity
that could be purchased were the financial capabilities and storage
facilities of the buyer. 155
The fact that National Dairy might be taking a loss on .03% of
its total sales, whereas a competitor (the position of the firm chosen for
comparison purposes is probably at the high end of the spectrum, but
its proportion of sales in a relatively localized market is certainly vastly
more typical of the single market firm than is National Dairy's pro-
portion) would be be taking a loss on nearly 40% of its total sales is
illustrative of the kind of leverage a large conglomerate may have
when it masses resources in one market. Proportionately, its losses
might be so small that its stockholders could hardly notice them. Its
competitors will notice very much, however: National Dairy sold 27,-
994 cases of jelly in the Baltimore-Washington-Richmond-Norfolk area
in January and February, 1960, and 168,977 cases in the 12 months of
1960. It sold 400,803 cases in 26 days during the promotion of January
and February, 1961. The promotion went so well, in fact, that Na-
tional Dairy had to cut back on the original offer:
Instead of delivering the free cases according to the terms of the
one-for-one promotion, National Dairy delivered only 153,909 cases
and paid $829,005 in cash in lieu of delivering the remaining
246,894 cases. 156 The total cost of the promotion to National Dairy
was $1,345,502; $516,577 represented the value of the 153,908 cases
155. FTC CONGLOMERATE MERGER REPORT at 434.
156. (Renumbered FTC footnote)
The Court held that the evidence supported the Commission's findings as to the
reasons National cut back on the promotion. The Commission found that 'Na-
tional knew the market was glutted during the 26-day period; knew the Com-
mission had commenced an investigation of . . . [National's] practices; and it was
not until five weeks thereafter (April) the cash in lieu of free goods diversion of the
program was seized upon. The Commission further found . . . [National's] supply
of fruit spreads for the areas in issue was adequate to meet the demand from the
program (Opinion, p. 7).
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of free goods delivered, and $829,005 the sum of the cash payments.
After the deal, National Dairy sold an additional 145,695 cases
during 196 1.157
The F.T.C. staff's conclusion, complete with the comments of some
of National's competitors bears quoting:
From an economic standpoint, the issue is not simply the diver-
sion of trade from the regional producers as such, it is how con-
glomerate power may be used in a particular market to restructure
that market or change the conduct of the firms. National Dairy
exercised conglomerate power when it introduced its extraordinary
promotional deal. The company's size and diversification, com-
pared to those of its regional competitors, enabled it to wield this
conglomerate power. Thus, structural imbalance and the conse-
quent availability of differing strategies-based on differences in
firm structures among the competitors-were the sources of
National Dairy's power. The one-for-one deal was available only
to National Dairy as a market strategy or conduct option in the
four-city area. Its three regional competitors could not meet it, let
alone originate it. The president of Theresa Friedman testified
that when the buyer for the Giant chain of supermarkets asked him
what he intended "to do about" the Kraft deal, he answered:
I told him there was nothing I could do about it because any-
thing that I would do would be so small compared to the Kraft
deal, it just wouldn't pay to do anything.
At that time he advised me that he thought I was correct....
Polaner's president testified that he would have been 'out of busi-
ness in short order' if he had offered the same deal as Kraft. He
said:
... we felt if we did offer such a promotion to meet what was
being done, and if our customers would take us up on the
promotion, that we could not stand the quantity of free goods
that may have to be given out. We felt the danger was too
great to attempt to meet it.
The president of Old Virginia testified that to have followed Kraft
'would have broken us up."158
This kind of financial power-a power which is greater in the hands
of a conglomerate firm than in the hands of an equal-sized single
157. FTC CONGLOMERATE MERGER REPORT at 436.
158. Id., at 439-440.
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market firm-is made even stronger because it is actually subsidized
by our tax laws.
Since taxes are paid by a conglomerated corporation as a whole,
losses in one division can be subtracted from the profits in another
division. 159 This means that any possible losses in, for example, our
hypothetical (see diagram p. 286) A Division of D are shared by the
Internal Revenue Service (with the Federal Government absorbing
50% of the loss, if D is indeed large). 0° For the B Corporation, making
only one product, any actual losses are borne entirely by the B Cor-
poration,' 6 ' though the absence of profits may be "shared" by the
Internal Revenue Service. This is one of the cost savings of being not
only big but diversified, and is one way in which a size disparity of the
firms in the market may be magnified where the giant is a conglomerate.
Cross subsidization of legal losses may be just as harmful as cross
subsidization of illegal losses, in the long run. For example, over time,
one would expect that economic downswings and mild recessions,
which would adversely affect only one or a few industries, would occur
more often than recessions which affected all industries. One would
also expect regional recessions to occur more often than general, nation-
wide recessions. If a conglomerate operates in several markets and it
goes through a mild or regional recession which adversely affects only
one of its markets, then the conglomerate may end up surviving easily.
If all the other firms in the affected industry or geographic area,
however, are one-industry, non-conglomerate firms, then they may not
all survive. If a few go out of business, then that industry will be more
concentrated after the recession than before. The very fact that one
firm in the industry is a conglomerate-even without what will usu-
159. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1501.
160. Id., Section 11. The exact figure is 48% for taxable years beginning after December
31, 1964.
161. One qualification must be made to this statement: Losses in one year can be
"carried forward" and cancelled out against profits in any of the succeeding five years.
To what extent this possibility mitigates the relative position of the single product, as
against the diversified firm, we do not know. Since the single product firm must be strong
enough, even with this "loss carry forward" provision, to finance the entire loss until
such time as it can manage to make a profit, we suspect that the loss carry forward provi-
sion helps the corporation which made a loss to stand better, once it is on its feet, but
does not especially help it to get on its feet.
In one respect the loss carry forward provisions encourage mergers. A loss carry over
may be lost, "wasted," if the firm does not make profits last enough to exhaust it within
the time limit specified in the Internal Revenue Code. A firm that has a large loss carry
over (provided its annual losses do not appear to be a permanent feature) may therefore
be an exceptionally attractive merger partner for another corporation making profits.
See FTC CONGLOMERATE MERGER REPORT 151-155.
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ally be present, namely oligopoly profits in some of that firm's markets
-may tend to result in greater concentration in particular markets,
over a period long enough that shifts in demand, or regional recessions,
can occur.
Also, on the basis of size alone, D may be able to obtain capital more
easily, and may be able to bargain for favorable price discrimination
in obtaining advertising or other services. Such advantages may be
associated with volume purchases, as in Proctor & Gamble's advertising
advantages, 162 or, as Professor Turner has suggested, with respect to the
costs of borrowing.16 3 Or they may be associated with institutional
factors. For an example of the latter, take the case of the small grocer,
dealt with in an earlier FTC report:
Small retailers appear to face obstacles in obtaining desired store
locations. There are several reasons for this. First, many of the most
desirable sites for new markets are located in shopping centers.
The developers of shopping centers generally prefer large, well-
established retailers because they have demonstrated their ability
to get and maintain high store traffic. The small retailer, and
certainly an entirely new entrant into food retailing, lacks such
consumer acceptance.
Second, those financing shopping centers often require that the
developers provide space only to those food retailers that have
AAA credit ratings. To obtain such a rating requires a minimum
net worth of $1 million . 64
Another institutional bias in favor of bigness arises from Federal
Government contract procedures. If there is any possibility of making
sales to the Federal Government, especially the Department of Defense,
it is common experience that large corporations find it easier to get
defense contracts than do small corporations. 65
If the competitive disadvantages of smallness and specialization are
162. Cf. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Company, 386 US. 568 (1967), where this was made
a basis for the decision.
163. Turner, supra note 119, 1338-1339 Professor Turner suggests that the lower prices
of large volume borrowing may in fact be associated with lower real costs.
164. FTC ECONOMIC REPORT ON THE STRUCTURE AND COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR OF FOOD
RETAILING at 295-296. [footnotes omitted].
165. LINOWES; MANAGING GROWTH THROUGH MERGERS (American Management As-
sociation, Inc., New York, 1968). This result is undoubtedly abetted, and perhaps rational-
ized entirely, on the basis of requirements than government contractors be "financially
sound." See PAUL, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS AND SUBCONTRACTS (Joint Com-
mittee on Continuing Legal Education Philadelphia, 1964), pp. 100, 168-170, 553-554.
Given the natural conservatism of a bureaucracy, it is dearly possible that a rule of thumb
could come into being such that "financial soundness" meant a net worth of, e.g.,
$1,000,000, or ten times the projected cost on the contract.
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serious enough, B may be led to attempt to merge with some other
conglomerate (or, at a minimum, big) firm. This the Supreme Court
refers to as the danger that the merger under scrutiny may "trigger
other mergers."' 6 If other mergers are triggered, a market of several
small firms will be replaced by a market of several large firms. The
degree of oligopoly may or may not be changed, in a numerical sense,
but economic freedom and individual initiative and opportunity in that
particular market will almost surely be reduced. In the long run, the
oligopolistic character of the market will be more firmly entrenched;
and in a behavioral sense, it will be tighter. Entry will be more difficult,
both subjectively and objectively.
It is also clear, for the same reasons, that barriers to entry will be
raised, simply because, in the terms of rivalry, a new firm, starting out
small, will "have to take on a giant.' u6 7 Other long-run economic effects
will occur for basically the same reason: The ability of the larger firm,
especially the conglomerated firm, to be able to predict its financial
position, its market position, indeed all of the factors influencing invest-
ment decisions, 168 with greater certainty-perhaps more relevantly,
with greater security-will always tend to make the larger, conglom-
erated firm more likely to invest at any given time. When scores of
smaller decisions are added together, over time, increased concen-
tration seems a reasonably probable long-run economic consequence.
As the FTC said of the National Dairy case:
[T]he facts indicate that the unregulated exercise of cross subsidiza-
tion-as well as the unregulated creation of such conglomerate
power through merger activity--can change the conditions of both
business survival and entry. These changes, plus defensive conduct
and merger activity by competitors, can be expected to restructure
an industry with probable adverse consequences. 69
On the basis of size alone, then, the introduction of a giant into a
market otherwise characterized by smaller independent firms will create
the same sort of harm to competition as are produced by a horizontal
merger, with the exception of elimination of competition between the
merging firms.170 We are, however, slightly less certain (but not uncer-
166. Cf. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Company, 386 US. 568.
167. Id., at 579.
168. See footnotes 104-116 and accompanying text, supra.
169. FTC CONGLOMERATE MERGER REPORT at 443.
170. See supra, Part IV, concluding pages.
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tain)' 17 than in the case of a horizontal merger that such a merger will
produce harm to the economic consequences of competition.
Despite the certainty of many of the adverse effects of such a merger,
no case involving solely the problem of the introduction of a giant into
a market has yet been brought before the courts. Reynolds, 72 Foremost
Dairies,173 and Beatrice Foods,17 4 the latter two predominantly geo-
graphic market extension cases, all prosecuted by the Federal Trade
Commission are perhaps the closest. Even these, however, involved a
trend toward concentration in the relevant markets, which the mergers
in question augmented and intensified. The substitution of nationwide
or regional tight oligopolies for local loose (or even tight) oligopolies
is clearly a harm to competition of which the courts will take cog-
nizance.175
2. Analyze Conglomerate as Horizontal or Vertical Merger
Philadelphia National Bank-Girard Trust 78  Vons Grocery-Shop-
ping Bag,177 and Pabst-Blatz178 had some geographic market exten-
sion aspects, but were also substantial horizontal mergers, provided
unfavorable geographic market definitions were applied. They were
treated as horizontal mergers.
Alcoa-Rome 79 and Continental Can-Hazel Atlas'8 0 had some prod-
uct extension aspects. The Court was undoubtedly right, however,
in seeing competition in fact between the companies involved in the
respective mergers, and in viewing the harm to competition as the same
sort that would result from a horizontal merger.
171. We are still satisfied that a harm is reasonably probable. See Part 4, Section A,
supra.
172. FTC v. Reynolds Metals Company, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir., 1962). This case con-
cerned a vertical merger, between an aluminum corporation and a processer of aluminum
foil into flower wrap. The court's rationale was that of a conglomerate merger, however.
173. 60 F.T.C. 944 (1962).
174. TRADE REG. REP. 17,244 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder at 22,317] (FTC 1965).
175. Beatrice Foods, TRADE REG. RaP. 17,244 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder at 22,317]
(FTC, 1965), and Foremost Dairies, 60 F.T.C. 944 (1962), present litigated cases where this
sort of geographic spreading of oligopoly was dealt with and prohibited. A more blatant
example is the group of mergers of major eastern and western oil companies, visible in
Table 3, supra p. 250; these appear to be an example of an already firmly entrenched
regional oligopoly becoming even more firmly entrenched by becoming national.
176. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), see supra note
96.
177. United States v. Vons Grocery Company, 384 US. 270 (1966). See supra note 129.
178. United States v. Pabst Brewing Company, 384 U.S. 546 (1966). See supra note 89.
179. United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964). See supra
note 87.
180. United States v. Continental Can Company, 378 U.S. 441 (1964). See note 88, for
a further discussion of the problems of market definition and the question of substantiality
in Alcoa-Rome and Continental Can-Hazel Atlas.
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3. Elimination of Potential Competition
Most conglomerate merger cases which have been dealt with as con-
glomerate cases has depended on a finding of some ancillary harm. One
of these ancillary harms is the elimination of potential competition.
In El Paso Gas-Pacific Northwest Gas, 81 the harm to competition
was in the geographic market where El Paso already sold. Pacific North-
west was so close to being in actual competition in that market that
it had already negotiated with one of El Paso's customers-forcing El
Paso to make price concessions in order to ward off actual entry. In
terms of actual sales, Pacific Northwest was more than a potential
competitor-it was an actual competitor-and the merger had a more
than passing resemblance to a simple horizontal merger.
In Penn-Olin, 8 2 and in Procter & Gamble-Clorox 83 as in El Paso-
Pacific Northwest, 84 there were problems of elimination of a potential
competitor. In Penn-Olin both joint venturers, Pennsalt and Olin
Mathieson, might logically have entered the southeastern market for
sodium chlorate independently. Since entry by one of the firms would
have left the other as a potential entrant exerting a competitive in-
fluence from the sidelines, 8 5 the merged venture would eliminate this
potential competition, and substitute a substantially larger firm where
there might have been two. On remand it was found by the District
Court that independent entry by either or both, separately, was not
"reasonably probable.' 18 6
In Procter & Gamble-Clorox the FTC specifically found that Procter
8c Gamble was the most likely entrant into the chlorine bleach market,
but did not find that entry by Procter & Gamble was probable. 87 The
181. United States v. El Paso National Gas Company, 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
182. United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Company, 378 US. 158 (1964).
183. United States v. Procter & Gamble Company, 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
184. United States v. El Paso National Gas Company, 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
185. United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Company, 378 U.S. 158 (1964). Pennsalt was
already shipping sodium chlorate into the Southeast from a western plant; Olin Mathieson
had licensed, royalty free, a paper bleaching process which required sodium chlorate, and
owned production facilities and know-how capable of being applied to the manufacturer
of sodium chlorate. Thus it seemed reasonable to suppose that either or both companies
might have considered entry independently. Turner, supra note 119, at 1371-73, discusses
this background.
186. United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Company, 246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del., 1965).
On a second appeal this finding (and the consequent judgment that the merger was not
illegal) was affirmed by an equally divided court. United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical
Company, 389 U.S. 308 (1967).
187. TRADE REG. REP. 16,673 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] (FTC 1963). This fact, and
its not very explicit recognition by the majority opinion in the Supreme Court, taken
together with the history of the same issue in Penn-Olin (supra, notes 7, 185, and 186,
and accompanying text) leave one somewhat in doubt as to just what must be proved by
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impact on the Supreme Court's decision of the elimination of Procter
& Gamble as a potential competitor is difficult to gauge, since this was
only one of four anti-competitive effects found by the Court. 8 It seems
likely that the Court would have found the merger illegal even if the
issue of potential competition were not present. 8 9
The influence of the issue of potential competition on legal thinking
about a particular merger may perhaps be best explained by quoting
from Commissioner Ellman's opinion for the FTC in Procter &
Gam b le-Clorox:
[T]he merger eliminates the salutary effect of Procter as a poten-
tial competitor of Clorox in liquid bleach. At the time of the
merger, Procter was a progressive and experienced manufacturer of
many products in the same product line as liquid bleach; it has in
the past frequently extended its product line by introducing a new
brand in an industry in which it had not theretofore been active;
it was one of the very few manufacturers of household products
in the same general line as liquid bleach that was powerful enough
to challenge, with some hope of success, Clorox's entrenched posi-
tion in the bleach market; and it had actually pondered the
possibility of entry into the liquid bleach market on its own. By
virtue of all these facts, Procter must have figured as a tangible
influence on Clorox's policies until the merger eliminated it as
a potential competitor. Procter, though in absentia, was nonethe-
less, by reason of its proximity, size, and probable line of growth,
a substantial competitive factor in the liquid bleach market. We
the government to make potential competition the determinative factor in a Section 7
case. The analysis of the problem of "potential competition" and what it may mean in
terms of disciplining otherwise non-competitive behavior by leading firms in an industry,
is analysed in United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods, 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill., 1968),
a case where a preliminary injunction was issued prohibiting the acquisition of George
Nissen, Inc., the largest manufacturer of glymnastic equipment, by Wilson. The opinion
suggests that it should not matter whether a likelihood of actual entry can be shown; all
that matters is that, before the entry by merger, the outside firm exerted a competitive
influence just because it was logically (and psychologically) the most probable entrant.
188. 386 U.S. 568 (1967). The other three were (1) intensification and hardening of
oligopoly conditions in the chlorine bleach market, by substituting a giant for the
already dominant firm in the industry, and probably triggering other mergers, (2) in-
creasing barriers to entry, and (3) making competition by independent producers more
difficult because of Procter & Gamble's advantageous position in getting favorable shelf
space treatment by grocers and Procter & Gamble's ability to get favorable advertising
discounts-Procter & Gamble's advertising expenditures, about $80,000,000, were approx-
imately twice as large as Clorox's total sales, about $40,000,000.
189. This statement is based in part upon the fact that Justice Harlan, who is some-
what less convinced of the far-reaching effects of Section 7 than the rest of the Court (He
has either dissented or written a special concurring opinion in every major merger case to
come before the Court since and including Brown Shoe) disagreed that the issue of poten-
tial competition was convincing upon the record, but nevertheless agreed that the merger
was illegal under Section 7.
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have said that the possibility of new entry may exercise a restrain-
ing influence upon oligopolistic firms, inclining them to maintain
prices at a level low enough to discourage entry. Prior to the
merger, Procter was not only a likely prospect for new entry
into the bleach market, it was virtually the only such prospect.
Once the threat of Procter's entry vanished, one of the last factors
tending to preserve a modicum of competitive pricing and business
policies in the liquid bleach industry was removed. As the Com-
mission, in a related context, has had occasion to observe, 'When
market concentration is high, the main, and sometimes the only,
restraint on the use of market power by oligopolistic sellers is
potential competition.' Foremost Dairies, Inc. [1962 TRADE REG.
REP. Transfer Binder, 15, 877].
We have no occasion to speculate on such questions as whether
or not Procter, had its acquisition of Clorox been blocked, would
in fact have entered the bleach industry on its own, or whether
or not, had it done so, the result would have been to increase
competition in the industry-although, with reference to the sec-
ond question, we note the Supreme Court's recent observation that
"one premise of an antimerger statute such as Section 7 is that
corporate growth by internal expansion is socially preferable to
growth by acquisition." Philadelphia National Bank, [374, U.S.
321, at 370] . . . . It is sufficient that the tangible possibility of
Procter's entry on its own into the liquid bleach industry was a
continuing and important procompetitive influence in that in-
dustry, and that the acquisition of Clorox, by eliminating that
possibility, thereby removed a critical check on the power of
Clorox to stifle effective competition in the sale of household
liquid bleach.19°
The economic, and psychological, results of eliminating a potential
competitor are clear enough from these cases-especially when the
harm to competition, both for its long run economic consequences and
for its own sake, is put in terms of "barriers to entry," or barriers to
independent action by smaller firms. The principal difficulty in as-
sessing the legal importance of the elimination of a potential com-
petitor through merger is the question of how probable actual entry
must be, in order for the elimination of a possible entrant to be legally
recognized as a harm.
Penn-Olin,191 as we have seen, was ultimately resolved in favor of
permitting the merger, largely on the grounds that actual entry by
190. TRADE REG. REP. 16,673 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder, at 21,584] (FTC 1963).
191. United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Company, 378 U.S. 158 (1964), and 389 U.S.
308 (1967).
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either joint venturer alone was not sufficiently likely to justify a holding
that competition might be lessened by the merger. 92 In the context
of the sodium chlorate market in the Southeast that might have been
a reasonable conclusion: The court was dealing with an effective max-
imum of two firms, with competitive restraints applied only by other
potential entrants. If neither firm was likely to enter independently,
a finding of no reasonably probable harm to competition from their
combined entry is at least plausible.
In Procter & Gamble-Clorox,193 where a giant conglomerate entered
a new product market already occupied by an assortment of firms,
Procter & Gamble entered by buying the largest firm in the market
they were entering. The Supreme Court seemed, in its opinion, to take
the psychological and behavioral effect of Procter & Gamble on the
market, as a potential competitor, somewhat more seriously (though its
opinion by no means cleared up this problem). 94 The F.T.C. con-
sidered the psychological and behavioral effects on the market quite
important, as the quote from their opinion, supra shows.195
In Wilson-Nisson,198 Wilson Sporting Goods Co., a "full line"
manufacturer of sporting goods (and a subsidiary of Ling-Tempco-
Vought197), entered a new product market, gymnastic equipment, by
buying the largest manufacturer of gymnastic equipment-the George
Nissen Co. There, rather than analyze the question of causation in
detail, the court viewed the "frame of reference"'98 in judging whether
a merger might be proscribed by Section 7 to be, not competition in
the present, but competition in the future. With that as the frame
of reference, it is not necessary to show that a merger will reduce
competition below its present level. What is necessary is to show that
future competition will be less if the merger occurs than if it does
not occur.
Having taken this frame of reference, the court said:
192. United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Company, 389 U.S. 308 (1967).
193. United States v. Procter & Gamble Company, 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
194. See Justice Harlan's opinion 386 U.S. at 581 where he regards it as "just as
probable" that a small firm would put forth extra effort in the presence of a giant, as
that it would be circumspect and trepid. For reasons dealt with, supra, in Part 4, Section
A (1), and at footnote 146 and accompanying text, we feel otherwise. Nevertheless, the
matter still seems to rest on psychological speculation.
195. Supra note 190.
196. United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Company, 288 F. Supp. 543 (1968).
197. 288 F. Supp. at 544.
198. Professor Turner's phrase. supra note 119 at 13.
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[V]irtually anything [Wilson] could do would be more pro-com-
petitive than the path it has chosen. It is aware of the attractive
opportunities in the gymnastic apparatus field, and like Proctor
& Gamble in Clorox, has decided upon a quick and easy way to buy
a leading position in the industry. If Wilson were to enter through
internal expansion, that obviously would increase competition by
adding another competitor to the market. If instead it entered by
buying one of the small companies in the field, 'it would have the
effect of increasing the strength of a small company at the expense
of the leading companies, and that would be more pro-competi-
tive." 99 If it simply continued waiting on the sidelines as an inter-
ested bystander, that might have some effect in restraining price ex-
ploitation in the market, and that would be more pro-competitive.
Hence, by disallowing the merger we would insure a benefit to
competition in the market. It is apparent, therefore, that the
proposed merger would probably have the effect of lessening com-
petition in the industry, in violation of Section 7.200
The Stigler Committee suggested a completely objective test for
"potential entry": Don't identify potential entrants by introspection,
do it by past performance:
The identity of potential entrants should not be established by
introspection. If the producer of X is truly a likely entrant into
the manufacture of Y, the likelihood will have been revealed and
confirmed by entrance into Y of other producers of X (here or
abroad), or by the entrance of the firm into markets very similar
to Y in enumerable respects.201
4. Reciprocity Power
The other collateral circumstance that the Courts have used to justify
holding that a particular conglomerate merger violates Section 7 is the
possibility for coercing reciprocal dealing.202 Reciprocal dealing, or
reciprocity, is simply the practice whereby A says to B, "I will buy
your product if you buy mine." Reciprocity power can be created by a
merger between two firms one (or more) steps removed in a chain of
production: Suppose A buys from B, and B buys from C; if A merges
with C, B may feel compelled to buy from C, in order to retain A as
a customer.
199. Court's footnote omitted.
200. 288 F. Supp. 543 at 563.
201. The STIGLER REPORT supra note 23.
202. FTC v. Consolidated Foods, 380 U.S. 592 (1965), is perhaps the leading Supreme
Court case on this issue.
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FIGURE VII
To the extent that B can be compelled to buy from C, C's competitors
will be foreclosed from selling to B. This is the same sort of harm that
might result from a vertical merger.203 The principal legal uncertainty
in this area (aside from the substantiality question) is whether the
creation through merger of the power to engage in reciprocity practices
is sufficient to prove illegality, or whether a reasonable probability
that this reciprocity power will actually be used must be proved.20 4
In the one reciprocity case thus far decided by the Supreme Court,
Consolidated Foods-Gentry205 the majority decided on the grounds that
reciprocity power was enough. There was abundant evidence, however,
that reciprocity power would be used,20 6 and had been used, even with
some success.
207
Indeed, the only case thus far decided in which reciprocity power,
unaided by any showing that there was a reasonable probability that
the power would be used, was cited as a determining factor was Inger-
soll-Rand Goodman-Lee-Norse. 208 And in that case, the horizontal as-
pects of the merger would probably have rendered it illegal without
reciprocity power.
203. See Part 4, Section F(2), supra.
204. Note the similarity to the question whether, in a potential competition case,
proof must be submitted that the corporation outside the market in question was actually
about to enter, or whether the subjective (on the part of competitors in the market
it entered by merger) impression that it might have been about to enter is sufficient.
205. FTC v. Consolidated Foods, 380 U.S. 592.
206. Id., at 596-97.
207. Id., Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, at 607-08.
208. United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W. D. Pa. 1963), aff'd, 320
F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963).
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Ingersoll-Rand is balanced by Reynolds Tobacco-Penneck & Ford °20 9
where, in the face of a large amount of evidence of corporate purpose
not to engage in reciprocity practices the court held there was no rea-
sonable probability of harm to competition, at least in the context of
a request for a preliminary injunction. (The strength of this conclu-
sion, as to the necessity for showing more than the mere power to en-
gage in reciprocity practices, is weakened by the fact that the Court
also found that even if the harm could be found to be probable, it
would not probably be substantial, since the maximum market fore-
closure was about 10% to 12%.)210
In view of the difficulty of proving actual use of reciprocity power,
a difficulty which has been examined by several commentators,211 there
would seem to be a strong argument for holding that the mere existence
of reciprocity power, created by a merger should be a sufficient cause
for enjoining or ordering divestitute of a merger. The only difficulty is
whether one can say that the use of the power is "reasonably probable,"
given that that use is illegal. That question is avoided if one examines,
not the actions or probable actions of the firm with reciprocity power,
but the probable reactions of small independent firms and potential
small entrants. If there is a giant in one's midst, with power to effec-
tively close off one's market, one may not wish to test whether the giant
is law abiding. Shooting people is illegal, but in the presence of a man
with a loaded gun, most of us will avoid action that would make him
want to shoot us. The existence of reciprocity power, thus, can act as
a clog on competition, regardless of the intent to use it, or whether it
is ever actually used. This conclusion is especially evident if on analyzes
the effect of reciprocity power on competition as an end in itself.
In the long run, the effects of reciprocity will be felt through the
effects of reciprocity power on the investment decisions of competitors
of the reciprocal partners. If they believe their market will be cut off
(because they think it can be cut off), then potential entrants and smaller
competitors will tend to either merge defensively, or drop out. These
long run effects on smaller present and potential competitors is intensi-
209. United States v. Penick & Ford, Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 518 (D. N. J. 1965). The
opinion in this case, on the question of whether or not a preliminary injunction should
be issued, notwithstanding, a consent judgment was entered September 22, 1969, in
which divestiture was ordered. This fact would seem to blunt the effect of the original
decision not to grant a preliminary injunction.
210. See note 227, infra.
211. See, e.g., Davidow, Conglomerate Concentration and Section 7: The Limitations
of the Antimerger Act, 68 COL. LAw REv. 1231 (1968) at 1267.
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fled where the entire industiral structure of the nation tends to revolve
around a relatively few conglomerate firms with strong reciprocity ties.
For example:
An incident arising between Du Pont and U.S. Steel illustrates
... how 'great corporations stand together' in solving their com-
petitive problems. In the early 1960's Du Pont experienced a per-
sistent decline in sulfuric acid sales to U.S. Steel. In 1962, Du
Pont made a survey to determine what might be done to reverse
its declining sales. The following are excerpts from the Conclusions
and Recommendations of its U.S. Steel Survey.
It is obvious that while our [Du Pont] goal is to reverse current
sulfuric acid purchase trends, exactly the opposite will result
unless we take positive action. The purpose of this meeting is to
formulate a plan of action. Let us consider the following:
2. In a recent press conference, Roger Blough stressed the
seriousness of plastic competition. Let's urge Plastics Department
Sales Management to explore at high levels the advantages and
problems of cooperative sales efforts with U.S. Steel-e.g.-the
sale of Delrin pipe(Du Pont plastic pipe).
3. If the sulfuric acid market in St. Louis has acute over ca-
pacity and the prospects for improvement are slight would
Monsanto consider discontinuing production at East St. Louis
in favor of purchase? Can we encourage this by purchasing
HCL at Cleveland from Mobay [a joint venture between Mon-
santo and Farbenfabriken Bayer AG at the time].
4. Encourage U.S. Steel Steel to discontinue sulfuric acid
manufacture at Donora in favor of purchase.
a. Direct from St. Joseph Lead Company
b. Direct from Du Pont... 21
5. Entrenching Oligopoly
Perhaps the most general rationale for holdings of illegality, dis-
cernable in the opinions relating to conglomerate mergers, to date, is
the entrenching of oligopoly. 213 If a giant firm such as Procter & Gamble,
which already operates in several oligopolistic markets, enters the
chlorine bleach market, another oligopolistic market, by purchasing
the dominant firm in the chlorine bleach market, then the oligopolistic
212. FTC CONGLOMERATE TO MERGER REPORT 465.
213. This is suggested as one type of harm, in Davidow, footnote 211, supra., at
1253-1255, and as the major basis, albeit an implicit one in several cases, for most of
the merger holdings in the 1960's, in Brodley, note 139, supra., passim.
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structure of the chlorine bleach market will become much more diffi-
cult to break up.214 Furthermore, the oligopolistic structure of the
"general household cleaning materials" market may also become
more difficult to break up. Oligopoly may be more firmly entrenched
in both the market of the acquired corporation and the market of the
acquiring corporation.215
If, in the long run, we want the kind of economic benefits that come
from reasonably free entry into markets, then a merger which entrenches
oligopolistic market structures in two markets, or even one market,
will tend to lessen the benefits we expect from competition. If we want
the kind of flexibilty and freedom of opportunity in our economy that
we associate with competition-both in the long run and the short run
-then a merger that assures that an oligopolistic market structure will
be with us for a long time in a major consumer goods industry will-
not may-lessen competition.
Any ancillary factors-the elimination of potential competition, or
the creation of reciprocity power, for example-would under this view
simply be mechanisms, additional structural characteristics, that one
would look to analyze the extent to which any particular merger en-
trenched oligopoly. Barriers to entry, as hinted in Procter & Gamble-
Clorox,2 16 could well be a relevant proxy, since any entrenching of
oligopoly in an industry would tend to increase barriers to entry. And
conversely, in an oligopolistic industry, any increase in barriers to
entry would tend to indicate, (and possibly cause) further entrench-
ment of oligopoly. 21 7
Oligopoly, however, is a hard thing to measure; and the degree to
which oligopoly is entrenched by a particular merger may come to be
a matter of just deciding that if the merger is "too big," it is illegal.
We certainly cannot say that the Supreme Court has come this far.
We can say that it has moved in this direction-further where oligopoly
is the issue than where pure bigness is concerned.
But bigness, almost as much as oligopoly, is recognized as creating
a threat to competition; it is recognized in the language of court and
FTC opinions, 218 and it is recognized by the way in which the majority
214. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Company 386 U.S. at 578.
215. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Company, 288 F. Supp. 543,
563-566 (1968); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 463-464 (1964).
216. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Corp., 568, 578-579, 595-597 (1967).
217. United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Company, 288 F. Supp. 543 (1968). And
see Part 4, Section F(3), supra.
218. Cf. Foremost Dairies, 60 F.T.C. 944 (1962).
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of the Supreme Court deals with issues such as barriers to entry.219 On
the other hand, no case to date, has been decided on the basis of bigness
alone: There have always been collateral problems, such as a visible loss of
potential competition, a special threat by way of lower advertising costs
or other cost savings due to favorable price discrimination on account
of bigness, or reciprocity power, or some way to stretch a market defini-
tion to cover the merger in question.
Such specific problems, added to bigness, and combined with oligop-
olistic market structures, may be enough to slow down acquisitions by
such giants as LTV, ITT, Northwest Industries, General Dynamics,
and (possibly shortly) Litton, simply because: (1) these corporations are
potential entrants by internal expansion into almost any field, and
(2) they may find it difficult to acquire any other corporation without
creating possibilities for reciprocity. 220 Stopping only these mergers,
however, will not 9tem the tide of concentration referred to in Parts I
and II of this paper: It may help in avoiding too much "super-big-
ness," 221 but it will do nothing about the slightly less than giant cor-
porate acquisitions.
By way of prediction, we can expect that the perceptible movement
of the courts and the FTC toward recognizing the creation of pure
bigness through merger, even in the absence of an oligopolistic struc-
ture in the market of the acquired firm(s), as a threat to competition
will continue. At some time within the next five or ten years, a merger
will be found illegal under Section 7 simply because it introduces a
giant into a field otherwise occupied by "human sized ' 222 firms. Just
how significant this prediction would be, even if largely undisputed,
remains to be seen.223
219. FTC v. Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
220. Cf. United States v. Ling Tempco Vought, Inc., complaint, supra note 9.
221. This word was contributed by Johanna Broughton, the four (then three) year
old daughter of one of the writers. It was initially used to describe one aspect of the
problem of a three year old dealing with (or from her point of view competing with)
parents.
222. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BirNESS (1964) (reprints of various papers written by
Justice Brandeis). "Human sized" does not, here, mean that we are advocating an in-
dustrial structure consisting of sole proprietorships. What is referred to is a size of
firm that a human being can comprehend. No specific upper limit can be named, of
course-Brandeis, who originated the term, also specified none-if for no other reason
than because different people have different levels of comprehension where complex
organizational structures are concerned. While the term clearly refers to something larger
than the "mom and pop" grocery, it also fairly clearly refers to something smaller than
the giant conglomerates or giant holding companies of today. Even someone with a
considerable background in corporation finance and corporation law, will not compre-
hend or have a "feel" for the structure of, say, LTV, General Dynamics, Ford Motor
Company, or AT&T, without considerable study.
223. Below Part V (C) and Part VIII.
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B. "Substantiality" in Conglomerate Mergers
It is easier to define substantiality than to apply that definition to
particular cases. A few principles governing applicability may be tenta-
tively put forward, however-tentatively because in our opinion the
principles in this area are somewhat in a state of flux, and they may,
particularly with some new members on the Supreme Court, be sub-
ject to change over the next several years.
The doctrine of "quantitative substantiality," first set forth clearly
in 1949,224 and adopted rather forcefully for Section 7 cases in Phila-
delphia National Bank-Girard Trust,225 has not to date been found
especially helpful in analyzing conglomerate merger cases. In the form
of concentration ratios, it may be used in gauging the impact of a
simple horizontal merger: The percentage of the market dominated by
the merged firm or by the top four or so firms, and/or the change in
concentration wrought by the merger-quantitative measures of market
dominance-are probably good guides to the competitive effects of such
a merger. Similarly, the percentage of the market foreclosed, or poten-
tially foreclosed, by a vertical merger is probably a fairly good guide
to the competitive impact of a simple vertical merger.
Where the merging companies do not make the same product, how-
ever, even if they are, in fact, competing, then it seems questionable
simply to add up in some geographic area, the total sales for the product
lines of both companies, or some part of those product lines, and take
a simple percentage of their aggregate.226 (Where present or potential
interproduct competition is eliminated by such a merger, however, it
should be possible to construct some function, of the position of each
of the merging partners in their respective product markets, that will
indicate in a quantitative way what the impact of the merger is.) Sim-
ilar arguments apply to mergers dealing with potential competitors,
reciprocity power, 227 or any other "conglomerate-type" problem. A
224. Standard Oil Company v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
225. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
226. As was done in e.g., United States v. Continental Can Company, 378 U.S. 441
(1964). See note 88, supra, for a note on this aspect of the Continental Can-Hazel Atlas
case.
227. Professor Turner, note 119, supra, at 1390-1391, suggests that reciprocity pos-
sibilities be related to the test of substantiality in requirements contracts. If a foreclosure
of, say, 7 per cent by a requirements contract (or a vertical merger) is viewed as sub-
stantial, he suggests, then a possible foreclosure by reciprocity power; assuming it were to
be completely effective, of 15% to 20% should be considered substantial.
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fortiori, a concentration-ratio test of substantiality cannot usefully be
applied to a "pure" conglomerate merger.
What tests of substantiality can be applied in conglomerate merger
cases? We suggest two criteria: First, the size of the reasonably prob-
able economic impact of the merger, measured (a) in absolute dollar
terms, (b) possibly in terms of the number of people affected, and/or
(c) in terms of the proportion of some identifiable field of economic
activity. Second, the context in which the merger takes place-e.g.,
whether it takes place in a market that has been undergoing a trend
toward concentration, whether it is a loose or tight oligopoly, and/or
whether oligopolistic conditions are spreading vertically or geograph-
ically in the industry.
The size of the problem, and whether that size is compounded by
the existence of a trend which is regarded as inimical to competition:
these are the criteria that have been applied in one way or another in
almost every merger case before the Supreme Court, since Section 7
was amended.
Brown Shoe-Kinney,2 8 although not really a conglomerate, intro-
duced this non-quantitative substantiality test. That case involved a
potential vertical foreclosure of as little as 5% and as much as 57%.
The Court regarded the lower figure as "substantial," because of (1) a
trend toward vertical integration in the shoe industry, and (2) the fact
that many independent shoe manufacturers would be closed off from
the market if the trend toward linking retail outlets with manufacturers
continued.2 2 9 The horizontal combination was also regarded as threat-
ening a "substantial" harm, with market dominance being 5%. The
Court felt that the loose structure of the market was threatened by even
so small a combined market share, given, again, the existence of an
incipient trend toward concentration.23 0
In Vons Grocery-Shopping Bag,231 the Court similarly found a trend
toward concentration in the retail grocery business in Los Angeles, and
relying in large part on the existence of this trend found a merger
which resulted in a 7.5% market share illegal.
228. Brown Shoe Company v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
229. Id., at 332-34. In addition, Justice Harlan emphasized the size of the possible
foreclosure in terms of the probability that independent shoe manufacturers would "fall
by the wayside" as a result of the merger. Id., at 373.
230. Id., at 343-44.
231. United States v. Vons Grocery Company, 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
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In more typically conglomerate cases, where the type harm discussed
has gravitated more and more toward barriers to entry and inhibition
of independent competitive action by smaller firms, the question of
substantiality has tended to rest almost solely on a preliminary recita-
tion of numbers indicating the total size of the market which could be
affected.232 Since the size of the market represents the possible impact
of the merger, a showing that a merger could affect a substantial market
raises an implication that the merger would "reasonably probably"
have some substantial anticompetitive effect.233 Predictions of the exact
proportion of this market which might be affected may be well nigh
impossible, in many cases.
The above suggestions are meant to indicate the current state of the
law, not to defend that state. It is in this area, a description of the
tests of substantiality where conglomerate mergers are concerned, where
the law is most in need of clarification. A more exact analysis of the
long run economic consequences of competition, and a more definitive
statement of just what it is that the antitrust laws are supposed to pro-
tect might well help in this clarification. So, of course, would a more
exact empirical analysis of the actual economic consequences of con-
glomerate mergers.
One suggestion, perhaps a third criterion, in addition to those sug-
gested above, which we were led to in a tentative way by the analysis
of the manner in which conglomerate mergers can entrench the
market power of the leaders of oligopolized industries, has since
been suggested by the Neal Committee,2 34 and by the FTC Conglo-
merate Merger Report. Where a large firm outside an industry acquires
one of the leaders in an industry, then there will be some entrenching
of the oligopoly structure of all the markets in which the conglomerated
firm now operates. Depending on certain relative size variables-the
concentration in the markets of both the acquired and acquiring firms,
the closeness of the products (the "circularity" of the merger, the extent
to which common distribution channels, manufacturing processes, etc.
can be utilized), the relative size of the acquiring and acquired firms,
and perhaps the absolute size of the firms-this harm may well be
substantial.
232. Cf. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Company, 386 U.S. 568 (1967) and FTC v. Con-
solidated Foods Corporation, 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
233. Id.
234. White House Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy, BNA Antitrust and Trade
Regulation Report No. 411 (May 27, 1969). This Task Force, appointed by President
Johnson, was Chaired by Dean Phil C. Neal, of The University of Chicago Law School.
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The FTC Conglomerate Merger Report suggests the following:
Although it is impossible to draw simple rules to encompass all
possible industrial settings within which anticompetitive leading
firm conglomerate mergers might occur, we believe that the follow-
ing criteria describe those most likely to violate the law:
(1) When the acquiring corporation is a large enterprise hav-
ing a substantial volume of sales in one or more concentrated
industries. (For this purpose a large firm is defined as having
annual sales or assets in excess of $250 million.)
(2) When the acquired company is one of the leading firms in
at least one concentrated industry. (A concentrated industry is
defined as one in which the 4 leading firms account for 40 per-
cent or more of sales. A leading firm is one included among the
4 to 6 largest sellers in an industry.)235
The Neal Committee suggested an alternative, but closely related
measure; recommending that merger between "large" firms, and lead-
ing firms in any particular product and geographic market not be
permitted.2 36
235. FTC CONGLOMERATE MERGER REPORT at 17.
236. "White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy," footnote 234, supra. Specifically,
the report suggested, at 15, the following:
Appendix B. Merger Act
Section 1. Prohibited Acquisitions
(a) No large firm shall directly or indirectly merge with, combine with, or acquire
any equity security in any leading firm or directly or indirectly acquire all or sub-
stantially all the assets used by a leading firm in any market in which it is a leading
firm.
(b) No leading firm shall directly or indirectly merge with, combine with, or ac-
quire any equity security in any large firm or directly or indirectly acquire all the
assets of a large firm or a part thereof sufficient to constitute a large firm.
Section 2. Definitions.
As used in this Act
(a) The term "large firm" shall mean a firm engaged in commerce which, giving
effect to any acquisition or other transaction referred to in section 1 of this Act and
all acquisitions or other such transactions completed at or prior to the effective date
of such acquisitions or other transaction,
(i) had or would have had sales which exceeded $500 million during the most
recent base year, or
(ii) had or would have had assets which exceeded $250 million at the end of the
most recent base year.
(b) The term "leading firm" shall mean a firm engaged in any market in which
its market share was more than 10% during at least two base years, and in which
the aggregate market share of any four or fewer firms during the same two base
years was more than 50%, provided that the term "leading firm" shall not include
a firm whose market share during the same two base years was not among the four
largest in such market.
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C. Limitations of Antitrust Law
If antitrust law has reached a stage where it can be predicted that
the problem of pure bigness will be recognized by the courts, and that
"giantism" will be defined as a sufficient basis to hold a merger illegal
under Section 7, why does that current merger wave continue so
vigorously?
A major reason is that the Supreme Court has not yet said that a
giant entering a field of human sized firms by merger is illegal. Further-
more, it may be some time before it so holds. It is the fact that merger
cases take so long to wend their way through trial and appeal to the
Supreme Court,23 7 that makes us willing to predict such a holding only
within the next five to ten years. 238
If it takes as long as ten years for the message to get through to the
business community, that will be too late: whatever overall undesirable
effect may result from the current merger movement will have already
occurred.
What can be done? One thing is to concentrate on deterrence-unfa-
vorable publicity alone might have some effect; Another might be to
make changes in other laws-e.g., tax laws-designed to discourage (or
at any rate to stop encouraging) mergers; Another might be to pass a
new law, amending Section 7, which would provide for simplified pro-
cedures and substantive tests of legality.
We will take up, here, some deterrent actions, and some possibilities
for changes in the antitrust laws.
VI. GUIDELINES
The new Guidelines ofboth the FTC and the Department of Jus-
tice, setting forth their enforcement policies with respect to mergers,
237. Appeals procedure depends on whether the case is initially brought by the
FTC or by the Justice Department. If by the FTC, then the appeal line is to one of
the Courts of Appeals-in any Circuit where the defendant does business. (If the Com-
mission decides that a merger does not violate Section 7, no appeal lies by the FTC
Staff). From the action of the Court of Appeals, either party may apply to the Supreme
Court by writ of certiorari, and the Supreme Court may, if it chooses, hear the case. If
the case is brought by the Department of Justice, it will be brought in a District Court
in some district where the defendant does business. In most cases the judgment of the
District Court could be appealed to a Court of Appeals. In antitrust cases, however,
application by either party to the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari represents the
only chance of having the case heard on appeal.
238. In United States v. Continental Can Company, 378 U.S. 441 (1964), it was seven
years between the merger and the Supreme Court opinion. In FTC v. Procter & Gamble
Company, 386 U.S. 568 (1967), it was ten years between the merger and the Supreme
Court decision. And in FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corporation, 380 U.S. 592 (1965), it
was fourteen years.
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represents an experiment in trade regulation and antitrust enforce-
ment.2 39 Instead of relying on case by case processes to disseminate
policy, they now are offering blanket advice in advance concerning their
probable enforcement activity on mergers. This is a. break with past
procedures, and is an effort to inform the business community of
current merger policy and to deter merger activity.
The guidelines issued by both agencies are experimental in philos-
ophy, and seem to be addressed to a wider range of merger and market
criteria than have been encompassed by formal litigation. Their sim-
ilarity is in their purpose, and ends there.
The FTC's policy statements pinpoint specific segments of the
economy where it is believed that further merger activity would tend
to substantially lessen competition. The guidelines represent the ex-
pertise developed through economic investigation by the FTC.240
Between January 1967 and May 1968, the FTC issued five sets of
policy statements based on its formal studies in five sectors of the
-economy. The policy statements encompassed (1) vertical mergers in
the cement industry, (2) product extension mergers in grocery product
manufacturing, (3) mergers in the food distribution industries, (4) tire
manufacturing activity and (5) retail gasoline sellers. 241 It should be
noted that since 1950, the FTC has been active in merger cases only
in these areas or very closely related areas. In each set of guidelines
a history of the industry, as well as the specific criteria that will be used
in evaluating merger activity in the industry, is developed.
The Department of Justice's Guidelines by contrast seem to be a
wide veil, covering all merger possibilities that they believe come under
the scope of Clayton Section 7.242 Their Guidelines are set up to
evaluate mergers according to market structure criteria. The merger
activity is judged by whether it lessens or tends to lessen competition-
competition for its own sake as well as for its economic consequences.
The Department of Justice's Guidelines fall into three separate sec-
tions: horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate activity. The Department
has devised broad criteria for each category. The criteria include: rela-
tive market share, degree of concentration (speed of change, number
239. Division of Antitrust, Department of Justice Guidelines, May 30, 1968.
240. B. Boca, MERCERS AND MARKETS: (7th Ed., National Industrial Conference Board
#105, New York, 1969) at 93.
241. Id., at 94; FTC Guidelines, see also Kerr, A Quest for Some Certainty: Guide-
line (1968) and Task (1969) Approaches to Merger Law. 8 DuQ. L. REV. 95 (1969).
242. Department of Justice, supra note 239.
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and sales), barriers to entry, reciprocal buying, power potential entry,
possible triggering of other mergers, etc.
In their present forms both sets of guidelines seem to be an image
of existing court decisions. 243 This is especially true with respect to
vertical and horizontal activity. Both agencies seem to handle these
types of merger activity admirably well. This is not so with conglo-
merates.
Guideline policy concerning conglomerates has, since 1967-1968, come
to contain a new spirit and a new shift of emphasis. Both agencies
are taking a more active role to try to stem merger activity in its
incipiency. The change in emphasis is shown by the active role of the
FTC concerning Kennecott-Peabody Coal,2 44 White Consolidated In-
dustries-Allis Chalmers2 45 and the Department of Justice's concern
involving Ling-Tempco-Vought-Jones and Laughlin Steel,246 IT & T-
Canteen,247 IT & T-Hartford Insurance,2 48 and Northwest Industries-
B. F. Goodrich.2 49 The more active role of the agencies is also shown
by the FTC's investigation of conglomerate activity.250 FTC question-
naires were sent to some 450 companies in the $250 million or more
category. If a firm is going to acquire a company with $10 million or
more in assets, it must now fill in this questionnaire. No reporting
requirement existed at all, till March, 1969. At that time the FTC
issued an order requiring companies making acquisitions to name the
acquired firm and the way in which it planned to acquire it.
Now, under an amended order issued in May, 1969,251 the procedure
is much more complex and informative. The acquiring firm must name
every industry in which it does business, and the amount of business
243. B. BocK, supra note 156 at 109-10.
244. In re Kennecott Copper Company, FTC Docket No. 8 765. Complaint Issued
August 5, 1968.
245. 3 TRADE REG. REP. 18688. White Consolidated Industries acquisition of Allis
Chalmers. FTC "determined to issue" complaint, in absence of settlement by consent
agreement, on March 6, 1969. See also Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company v. White
Consolidated Industries, Inc., 414 F.2d 506 (C.A.3d, 1969) in which the denial of a pre-
liminary injunction by the trial court, 294 F. Supp. 1263 (D. Del., 1969) was reversed
on appeal.
246. U.S. v. Ling Tempco Vought, Inc., supra note 9.
247. U.S. v. IT & T Corp., Civil Action No. 96C924, U.S.D.C., N.D., Ill., Complaint
filed April 29, 1969.
248. United States v. IT & T Corp., Civil Action Nos. 13319, 13320, U.S.D.C. D. Conn.,
Complaint filed August 1, 1969.
249. United States v. Northwest Industries Inc., Civil Action No. 69 C 1102, U.S.D.C.,
N.D., Ill., Complaint filed May 21, 1969.
250. FTC CONGLOMERATE MERGER REPORT. This investigation is scheduled to con-
tinue at least through 1970, with the publication of future reports, as well as a number
of research papers used in preparing the FTC CONGLOMERATE REORT.
251. Mergers Face Tough Quiz, BUSINESS WEEK, May 17, 1969, p. 36.
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it does in each. The classification of products it buys must be down to
the fourth digit of the Census Bureau's Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion lists. The acquiring company must further list every product it
sells down to the seventh digit of the Census Bureau's Standard Indus-
trial Classification lists. The types of economic activity engaged in by
firms will now be readily available to the FTC.
Through this new procedure the FTC hopes, in part, to dampen the
amount of merger activity occurring in the economy. It also hopes to
get a sharper profile of the structure of the conglomerates in the
economy. By use of the product and factor classification information,
the FTC hopes to be able to identify actual and/or potential violations
of the antitrust laws. With computer analysis, the smallest overlap will
be evident. With instant recall and comparisons possible, policy state-
ments and enforcement action will be greatly facilitated. Closer con-
trol, more informative data and speed will enable the FTC to do a
more effective job. This will especially be true when the larger con-
glomerates come under scrutiny. These new disclosure rules should
deter and hinder further acceleration in the current movement, because
anticompetitive effects can be revealed to enforcing agencies quickly.
VII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
There are a number of ways in which the antitrust laws could be
amended to deal with the "conglomerate merger problem." Each pro-
posal, however, raises additional problems, some of which could be as
serious as the conglomerate problem itself. Let us briefly indentify some
avenues for change, and examine some of the problems with each.
A. Since size is a primary concern, perhaps all mergers above a
certain size should be prohibited, or perhaps all acquisitions by cor-
porations above a certain size should be prohibited. The main prob-
lems here are: (1) There is no universal agreement that size alone is
a primary concern;2 52 (2) such a prohibition would not solve the prob-
lem even if universal agreement did exist; and (3) prohibition might
have disastrous effects on capital markets.
The reason it would not solve the problem is that large companies
would still expand into new areas by internal expansion if the merger
route were closed off.253 At present, a company can expand by merger
252. Cf. Turner, supra note 119 at 1326-27.
253. Id.
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without actually spending any money, by making a tender offer to
"buy" stock with stock instead of cash.254 A prohibition of the merger
route may therefore slow down the rate of expansion of large companies,
because internal expansion would require the exchange of cash (or
other financial instruments) for real capital assets, subject to market
constraints and also to capital budget constraints. Internal expansion
would thus be slower and more difficult than external growth, which
is not subject to such constraints.
But if we really care about bigness, slowing down the rate of expan-
sion of the largest corporations will not be sufficient, unless that rate
of expansion is smaller than the rate of expansion of the economy as a
whole. If the largest (say the largest 200) corporations were to grow
internally faster than the Gross National Product was growing, then
their proportion of GNP would increase. Let us assume that it will not
be shown that stopping mergers alone would slow large corporations'
growth sufficiently to move the economy toward decentralization at a
politically acceptable speed. Then we might be led to the conclusion
that the only means of dealing effectively with the problem of pure
size would be for Congress to require the dissolution of every corpora-
tion that was larger than some legislatively fixed maximum size. 25
The writers of this paper are not prepared to advocate such a solu-
tion, at least not without seeing considerably more research than has
been done to date on the impact of such a law on many facets of society.
B. Since the time it takes to get definitive resolutions of antitrust
cases is a major weakness of the present enforcement of Section 7, one
reform that has been suggested by a number of students of antitrust is
an easier procedure for getting preliminary relief.256 Post-merger
divestiture is not always an adequate remedy.257 Assets have been
mingled, and personnel have moved from one company to another and
may have shifted to different functions. Customer lists, trade secrets,
254. This was done in the Ling Tempco Vought acquisition of Jones & Laughlin,
supra note 9.
255. A further issue, here, might be whether we care about relative bigness or absolute
bigness. If we are concerned with the effects of size disparity within an industry (or within
a market) then we are talking about relative bigness. If we are concerned with "human
sized" institutions (See note 222, supra), with the scale of entry into an industry, and with
economic freedom and opportunity for people-individuals-then we are talking about
absolute bigness. Within possibly differing size ranges we may be talking about both.
Part of the difficulty with current discussions of the "conglomerate merger problem"
(ours included) may be that it is frequently not clear just which the discussants are
concerned with.
256. See Davidow, supra note 211, 1271-1272, for a good discussion of this problem.
257. Id.
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expertise, all have been permanently transferred to the acquiring cor-
poration. It would be our prediction, for example, that when Clorox
is finally separated from Procter & Gamble (by spin-off or outright
sale), Procter & Gamble will enter the chlorine bleach market by
internal expansion or purchase of a smaller concern, and quickly and
severly erode Clorox's present position as the leader in that industry.
Unless provisions for court approval of preliminary injunctions were
conditioned on such stringent requirements for a showing of anti-
competitive effect that the convenience of the changed procedure was
wiped out, such a procedural change, however, would have the effect of
making the FTC and the Justice Department the principal adjudicators
of the legality of mergers. If a merger must await a five or ten year
period of trial and appellate proceedings before being consumated, it
will probably not be attempted, since the two corporations would have
no certainty that economic conditions, and the conditions of the com-
panies, five or ten years hence would make merger, then, desirable.
While it might conceivably be reasonable for Congress to prohibit all
large mergers, it does not seem reasonable to leave to the FTC staff
and the Justice Department the question of which large mergers to
prohibit, and which to permit.
C. The Neal Committee 58 had a suggestion on what to do about
the "ultimate" problem-economic and market power-as well as a pos-
sible solution to the merger problem.25 9 That suggestion was a proposed
"Concentrated Industries Act." If enacted by Congress, this would pro-
vide for civil suits by the Attorney General, in equity, to break up
oligopoly 260 markets to the point where no single oligopoly firm ac-
counted for more than 12% of any market 261 and to enjoin various
258. White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy note 234, supra., at 12-15, a "Con-
centrated Industries Act."
259. Id., at 15-17, a "Merger Act."
260. An oligopoly industry is defined, Id., at 13, as follows:
Section 4. Definitions.
As used in this Act.
(a) The term "oligopoly industry" shall mean a market in which
(i) any four or fewer firms had an aggregate market share of 70% or more during
at least seven of the ten and four of the most recent five base years; and
(ii) the average aggregate market share during the five most recent base years of
the four firms with the largest average market shares during those base years
amounted to at least 80% of the average aggregate market share of those same four
firms during the five preceding base years,
but shall not include any market in which the average aggregate sales of all firms
during the five most recent base years declined by 20% or more from such average
sales during the preceding five base years.
This definition is intended to require both a large degree of concentration, and stability,
in the sense that the firms occupying the top slots remain there.
261. Only "oligopoly firms" would be required by the act, § 1(e), to split up or
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forms of contractual and cooperative arrangements that produced
economic (and perhaps social) results similar to oligopoly.
This combination proposal-the proposed concentrated industries
act taken together with the proposed anti-merger act-would seem
to have a great deal to recommend them. They are neither
extreme in their economics, as is the suggestion to totally prohibit cer-
tain classes of mergers, nor procedurally extreme, as is the suggestion
to make the FTC or the Department of Justice in effect the final deci-
sion maker on the legality of a merger. Both acts provide reasonably
certain numerical tests for a violation.
The difficulty will be, not in administering these proposed acts, but
in being convinced, and in convincing Congress that the remedy which
these acts provide goes far enough to solve the problem, yet does not go
too far. An additional difficulty may arise in convincing the relevant
decision makers that a problem exists. Agreement even on that is not
yet universal. The Stigler Task Force, for example, does not believe a
problem exists. At least that Task Force would not act on the problem
until clear and convincing proof that it did exist, and what its dimen-
sions were, was presented .2 2 As we have noted above, 263 we feel that to
advocate this is to advocate inaction until such time as the disease has
perhaps become incurable. We take a contrary position: the possibili-
ties for harmful consequences of the current merger wave through a
major restructuring of the American economy are so great, compared
with the apparent possibilities for good, that the movement itself
should be slowed down or stopped until we have some certainty that
the possible harm will not take place.
otherwise shrink to a maximum of 12% of the market. An oligopoly firm is defined in
§ 4(b) as a firm whose market share (during at least 2 of the last 3 years) exceeded 15%.
Conceivably a firm whose market share remained stable over time at 14% in a market
which satisfied the definition of an oligopoly market, might be allowed to remain per-
manently with that share. The difference of 2% (it could be 3% at most) may not be
significant, but it leaves one wondering why it is there.
262. See note 23, supra. Interestingly, Professor Stigler, Chairman of the Stigler Task
Force, once criticized economists for not recognizing the danger that inhered in the 1898-
1940 merger wave. See Stigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger, 40 AMERICAN Eco-
NOMIC REVIEW, Supp. 23, 30-31 (1950):
It is sobering to reflect on the attitudes of professional economists of the period
toward the merger movement. Economists as wise as Taussig, as incisive as Fisher,
as fond of competition as Clark and Fetter, insisted upon discussing the movement
largely or exclusively in terms of industrial evolution and the economies of scale. They
found no difficulty in treating the unregulated corporation as a natural phenomenon,
nor were they bothered that the economies of scale should spring forth suddenly and
simultaneously in an enormous variety of industries-and yet pass over the minor
firms that characteristically persisted and indeed flourished in these industries. One
must regretfully record that in this period Ida Tarbell and Henry Demarest Lloyd
did more than the American Economic Association to foster the policy of competition.
263. See notes 53 and 54, supra, and accompanying text.
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A danger in taking this position is that it may be interpreted as a
belief that further study-of the kind that the Stigler Committee,
among others, suggests-is not necessary. Such study is very necessary.
Rigorous emiprical studies of the problems posed by the current merger
wave are sadly rare. Some of the problems, of course, are conceptual-
for example, we have not decided, firmly, whether Congress meant to
protect competition for its own sake. And not a few of these conceptual
problems relate to economic theory, especially as applied in a legal
framework.
Among the economic problems which must be dealt with is the
development of a definition of competition that can be applied within
the framework of antitrust law-now, but especially in the future. Tra-
ditional economic theory on market structure has not help much in
analyzing conglomerate mergers.2 64 The study of barriers to entry
undertaken by Bain265 is a step in the right direction; but even that
step tends to be cast in terms of static market structure analysis.
The tasks for lawyers and economists, then, are clear: Work out the
political, social and economic changes which are likely to result if the
merger movement continues.266 Also work out the political, social and
economic changes that are likely to follow if any of several proposed
solutions are adopted.
In the interim, we might go a long way toward a solution by con-
centrating on some things we do know. We might change the tax laws,
the antitrust laws, and/or the accounting requirements of the SEC to
encourage internal rather than external growth. By this means we
would encourage growth which would be governed by market forces
instead of financial staying power. As long as the less difficult method
of entry, external growth, is easily available, it will be used. We could
264. For reasons explored in Part 5, Section A; supra.
265. J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEw COMPETITION (1956).
266. A question that may have to be asked and answered ultimately by society, is
whether corporations, as entities, are worth preserving in the same way that communities
are worth preserving. That question is now being asked only by corporate management.
"Management" consists of individuals who have invested much time and effort in con-
structing the institution they manage. The institution, the corporation, is a social struc-
ture, as well as a set of economic functions. The individuals who comprise "manage-
ment" could hardly be expected to regard this social structure as valueless: Predictably,
their answer will be that the corporate structure is worth preserving for its own sake,
they will go to considerable effort to preserve it; the specific economic functions for
which the corporation was originally organized will be also predictably regarded as secon-
dary in importance to the preservation of the structure of the corporation itself. The
merger movement is one piece of evidence of this. The liberalization of state corporation
laws, especially with reference to how specifically the corporate purposes must be set forth,
(PA. Bus. Corn,. LAw [1968] § 204(3)) is one other piece of evidence.
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also channel mergers so that they would increase rather than reduce
competition.2 67
Fuller disclosures would also be helpful. Like modern mashed pota-
toes, it is sometimes hard to tell whether conglomerate financial state-
ments are artificial or real; their financial records are often merged,
and mixed, so as to make them almost meaningless as a tool for antitrust
analysis, or any analysis. 208 Product line, and geographic financial analy-
sis as a basis for financial reporting might produce a more valuable tool
for understanding conglomerates than we have yet had.
A change in emphasis in economic analysis might also be desirable: A
shift from product market orientation, with its various concentration
ratios to factor market 2 9 analysis. Many recent mergers seem to be
closely affiliated in a technological sense.270 By looking at control of
factors and/or sources of supply, new ratios, or some other quantitative
tests, may be able to be developed-ones that will be applicable to
multi-market, multi-product firms.
We know that the size of the firm acquired, or even the relative sizes
of both merging partners, does not necessarily indicate the competitive
consequences of a particular merger. We also know that many of the
current indicators used to test the competitive state of an industry by
structure, conduct, and performance do not tell us what we need to
know to analyze the competitive relationships of these new, multi-
product, multi-market firms. However, there often seems in many of
these firms to be some internal structure with the components related
in terms of control of similar factor markets. The extent to which
mergers may have lessened actual or potential competition, extended
market positions, raised barriers to entry, and created possible struc-
tural conditions which will restrict competition, may be revealed in
267. Competition could be increased, rather than lessened, if a large firm entering
a new industry entered by acquiring a small firm in the new industry, instead of one
of the leaders, or if the large firm expanded by building new facilities. This sort of
result is part of what is behind both the FTC and the Neal Committee suggestions
described, supra., footnotes 235 and 236 and accompanying text.
268. FTC CONGLOMERATE MERGER REPORT at 119-141 describes the current problems
of conglomerate financial reporting extremely well.
269. A "factor" is an input to a production process. Iron ore, coal, limestone, and
labor, for example are all "factors" in the manufacture of steel. Usually markets are
analyzed from the point of view of sellers-producers-and their costs. Any market can
of course be analyzed from the point of view of either buyers or sellers. Factor markets,
because the demand for factors is derivative-that is, the demand depends on the demand
for something else, namely the product manufactured by means of the various factors
of production-must often be analyzed from the point of view both of the buyers and
the sellers.
270. See, e.g., the oil company-chemical company mergers and the oil company, coal
company mergers, described in FTC CONGLOMERATE MERGER 302-312.
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intensive factor market analysis. These merging units are growing and
extending their control in many factor markets. The emphasis that
reciprocity power has been given in recent Justice Department com-
plaints is evidence that factor market relationships are being taken
seriously; to date the analysis has been largely qualitative--or at least,
it quantitative, only approximately so. Intensive quantitative factor
market analysis may prove to be a fruitful framework with which to
evaluate multi-product, multi-market firms.
Until these tasks have been researched, and some idea (not certainty,
but even an inkling-based on facts, not theory) as to possible answers
is before us, the "conglomerate merger problem" will continue to be a
problem.
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